Preparation, Perception, and Policy by Sundaresan, Savitar Vadul
Preparation, Perception, and Policy
Savitar Vadul Sundaresan
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy







Preparation, Perception, and Policy
Savitar Vadul Sundaresan
Chapter 1, “Emergency Preparedness: Rare Events and the Persistence of Uncertainty,”
develops a framework to understand how uncertainty might spike and persist after low-
probability events occur. Unexpected events can have lasting effects on financial uncer-
tainty, which in turn affects the real economy. This chapter uses a model in which the
realizations of ex-ante unlikely events endogenously result in lower levels of private in-
formation. Lower levels of information propagate within the model, as uncertainty makes
it harder for agents to acquire information about future periods, resulting in uncertainty
persistence. This model of uncertainty is applied to an economy with a financial market.
Uncertainty reduces asset demand and expected wealth, while increasing dispersion of
beliefs. It also reduces investment and output, and results in higher credit spreads. Data
on financial uncertainty, dispersion of beliefs, risk appetite, and credit spreads confirm
the predictions of the model.
Chapter 2, “Inattentive Valuation and Belief Polarization’, uses a similar motivation to
think about how two agents can disagree on the truth after seeing the same data. Based
on the recent literature in inattention, we build a model allowing identical agents, shown
the same set of signals from an objective state of the world, to permanently diverge in
their posteriors. The inattentive framework allows for two effects: a confirmation and a
confidence effect. The former states that agents who have a bias arrange their attention to
perceive signals that agree with that bias. The latter states that agents pay less attention
to any signal the more biased they are. These effects allow for permanent polarization of
posteriors, even on issues with objective truth.
Chapter 3, “The Real Consequences of Countercyclical Capital Controls”, looks at the
consequences of capital controls on investment and consumption in Brazil. Brazil is the
most preeminent case of controls being imposed countercyclically. We find that capital
controls have a significant negative impact on investment. The macro analysis uses a
synthetic control method and finds that investment could have been approximately 20%
higher if controls had not been put in place. The micro analysis uses a panel data ap-
proach and finds that the controls reduced the investment to assets ratio by as much as
40%, with some of its effects mitigated by the extension of subsidized credit by the gov-
ernment through the development bank. These results indicate that the renewed support
for controls since the Great Financial Crisis should be more cautiously evaluated as it
might harm the potential growth rate of Emerging Economies for a long-lasting period.
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Emergency Preparedness: Rare Events
and the Persistence of Uncertainty
1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Unexpected events of economic relevance can cause persistent jumps in uncertainty.
Uncertainty has both real and financial implications: In the real economy, it can reduce
investment and output through higher credit spreads or through firms’ choosing to
make production decisions later. In financial markets, spikes in uncertainty are often
accompanied by increased dispersion of beliefs, increased bid-ask spreads, increased
volatility, and decreased leverage. By focusing on the aftermath of rare events, this paper
presents and tests a model that explains patterns in uncertainty and the effects of
persistent uncertainty on real and financial variables.
Consider the examples of events marked by green lines in Figure 5.1 panel (a), each of
which could be considered ex-ante unlikely. The first is the terrorist attacks in September
2001. The second is Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. The third is the
flash crash in May 2010 - thought to have originated with high frequency traders, the
market plunged almost 10 percent and recovered within a few minutes. The fourth is the
downgrade of U.S. treasury debt by the S&P ratings agency in 2011. In each case, the
VIX1 spikes upon the occurrence of the event and then slowly reverts to its pre-shock
levels. In Figure 5.1 panel (b), we see that the uncertainty in panel (a) correlates to many
other variables, including (i) increased credit spreads for U.S. Corporate Bonds, which
measures borrowing costs; (ii) increased dispersion of analysts’ forecasts of earnings per
share, as constructed by Pinto (2010) and used by Li and Li (2014), which measures
differences of opinion; and (iii) decreased margin debt as reported by the NYSE, which
measures investors’ appetite for risk.
I propose a model to explain three observations: (i) uncertainty spikes upon the
realization of rare events; (ii) the spikes persist; and (iii) changes in uncertainty spill over
into financial and real variables. In this model, agents can invest in information about
1. The VIX is defined as the market’s expectation of the annualized percentage standard deviation of the
S&P index over a thirty day period.
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future states of the world. Upon the occurrence of any state, agents receive signals about
the future path of an asset’s price. Therefore, the quality of signals received is
determined by their informational investment decision. The benefit of investing in
information varies positively with the ex-ante likelihood of the state, but the cost is
assumed not to vary. In order to preserve informational asymmetries and prevent
perfect revelation of information in prices, all trade takes place through a perfectly
competitive market making sector. The value of the asset is also assumed to be
indicative of productivity in the economy, so financial movements and uncertainty have
implications on real decisions by firms, such as borrowing, investment, and production.
This model produces three theoretical results. The first result is that agents choose to
invest in more information for likely states of the world and less for unlikely states of the
world. Consequently, when an agent invests in information about one state of the world,
and that state occurs, signals about future states are less noisy (or, of a higher quality).
The inverse is also true. Thus, the occurrence of an ex-ante unlikely state results in
increased short term and long term uncertainty due to poor signal quality.
Second, the model results in increased long term uncertainty, which persists
endogenously. Poor signals result in a more dispersed distribution over possible states
in the subsequent period. The average quality of signals purchased under this dispersed
distribution will be worse than under a tight distribution, because signal quality is
positively correlated with the probability of a state’s occurrence. Therefore, an initial
unlikely event generates uncertainty, which persists and propagates by preventing
agents from concentrating the allocation of their informational resources and prolongs
the initial spike in uncertainty.
The third set of theoretical results stem from the interaction of agents’ signal quality
with the market makers’ information set. Because the market making sector prevents
perfect price revelation, this interaction causes spillovers into financial variables such as
volatility, bid-ask spreads, dispersion of beliefs and asset demand. Further, if the asset’s
3
value is correlated with aggregate productivity, signal quality can impact credit spreads,
which in turn have real effects on production and investment.
The informational investment mechanism I use will deliver uncertainty persistence
without long term learning under any circumstances where information is a good.
Therefore, there are several environments in which to explore the effects of this
mechanism. In this paper, I consider a framework where information gives agents an
advantage in trade. Choosing this environment to explore the spillover is helpful
because it allows the model to deliver predictions about financial uncertainty, while
maintaining portability into a macroeconomic setting. Fundamentally the patterns of
uncertainty are universal (that is, not specific to finance), but financial variables have
plentiful and frequently observed data. Therefore, taking the theory to the data is more
direct in a financial setting.
I provide three sets of empirical results. First, I non-parametrically estimate the
ex-ante probabilities of daily price movements in the S&P index. In a regression of the
VIX on those probabilities, the coefficients are significantly negative, showing that rare
events cause uncertainty. These results hold even when controlling for standard
predictors of the VIX such as volume of trade, the size of price changes, and the level of
the S&P index.
Second, I test the model’s mechanism for persistence - that increased dispersion in an
agent’s ex-ante beliefs leads to a flatter distribution over future states. I test that
increased dispersion in an agent’s ex-ante beliefs lowers future probabilities on average,
by showing that increases in the levels of the VIX are associated with lower ‘highest’
probabilities, ‘average’ probabilities, and dispersion of probabilities, and a smaller
negative correlation between volatility and rarity. These results are all consistent with a
with a theory of flatter future ex-ante distributions over price changes, as opposed to the
alternative hypothesis of multimodality.
Third, a calibration and simulation tests the model’s ability to match the VIX, credit
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spreads, dispersion of beliefs, and investors’ risk appetite. Using one period’s change in
the S&P index as inputs, the model outputs the next period’s opening value of the VIX at
a monthly frequency. The model’s predicted VIX is highly correlated with the data, both
in levels and in first differences, and the patterns of credit spreads, dispersion, and risk
match the data as well.
This model also provides a potential explanation of the ‘pricing kernel puzzle.’ This
puzzle arises from a mismatch between an agent’s theoretical and estimated stochastic
discount factor. Theoretically, if an agent invests in an asset, then her stochastic discount
factor (the amount that she values an additional future dollar of wealth) should
monotonically decrease in the future value of that asset. In reality, an agent’s estimated
stochastic discount factor is slightly U-shaped. I show that this pattern can be explained
by the increased uncertainty that arises from tail events. Uncertainty increases the
marginal value of a dollar and can curl both ends of an otherwise monotonically
decreasing stochastic discount factor, resulting in the U-shape seen in the data. I show
this result theoretically and empirically, by non-parametrically estimating the stochastic
discount factor and controlling for expected volatility.
1.1.1 Alternative Theories
Much of the existing literature on macroeconomic uncertainty employs one of two
theoretical underpinnings - rare disasters theory and Bayesian learning. This paper
relates to both and contributes to each. Rare disasters theory shows that the realization
of disasters (sometimes called black swans) - or usually the increased fear of their
occurrence - makes agents more uncertain. This theory (as described by, for example,
Orlik and Veldkamp (2014)) achieves a good description of macroeconomic (or, real)
uncertainty. The importance of the skew is also documented in Bekaert and Popov
(2012). However, if the black swan story were true for financial uncertainty, then the
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SKEW2 (or fatness of the left tail) of the VIX should be positively correlated with the
level of the VIX. Fatness of the left tail of the distribution would be a measure of fear of
disasters and should cause generalized uncertainty. In fact, as shown by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange itself,3 the two are not correlated and at a daily frequency, they
are actually negatively correlated - at about -0.13. This indicates that fear of rare events
does not constitute a full explanation of changes in financial uncertainty. The model in
this paper assumes no skewness in either the underlying process or in beliefs and, as a
result, does not have to explain this negative correlation.
The second standard explanation of uncertainty patterns is Bayesian learning, under
which a Bayesian agent learns and updates beliefs about the true parameters of the
economy through shocks. Bayesian agents learn very quickly, so when using Bayesian
learning, there is a tension between making the shocks big enough to match the
significant changes in economic dynamics and having the learning process be slow
enough that uncertainty is not resolved too quickly. It is evident from Figure 5.1 panel
(a) that because the level of the VIX repeatedly spikes, a purely Bayesian story might be
incomplete. Other papers have proposed using anticipated utility equilibria, limited
memory, or regime changes (such as is found in Bianchi and Melosi (2013)) to get
repeated spikes. The agents in this paper use Bayes rule to update expectations;
however, this paper delivers rare events that lead to uncertainty even with an infinite
amount of previous data.
This paper’s explanation of persistent uncertainty emerges along with a growing
literature on the subject. I will discuss the methods of two recent and notable
contributions. The first is Kozlowski, Veldkamp, and Venkateswaran (2015), in which the
authors posit that as agents use standard econometric tools to estimate the distribution
of aggregate shocks, the occurrence of an extremely unlikely event changes their beliefs
2. As calculated by the CBOE, it is a non-parametric measure of the skewness of the distribution of the
market’s expectation of annualized percentage price changes of the S&P index over the next 30 days
3. Report (2010)
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suddenly and increases their uncertainty. The uncertainty persists as the shock lives
permanently in the agents’ datasets. Using this setup, they are able to match the
downward shift in trend output of the great recession. The second is Fajgelbaum, Schaal,
and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014). In that paper’s framework, uncertainty over
underlying parameters of the economy affect firms’ decisions about how much to invest.
The results of those decisions inform other firms, which can learn from the distribution
of all investment returns. An initial spike in uncertainty causes fewer firms to invest,
resulting in lower levels of learning, and therefore uncertainty traps. This paper joins
this literature in trying to explain the persistence of uncertainty from a complementary
angle: Instead of trying to understand agents’ learning of economic parameters, this
model focuses on endogenous information acquisition.
1.1.2 Literature Review
This paper borrows modeling techniques from two sources. First, it uses a reduced
form of the inattention structure built in Woodford (2012a), which shows how rare
events cause poor conditional identification. Second, in order to preserve uncertainty
when trading and prevent price revelation, it uses a simple batch-order version of the
market makers designed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The initiation and preservation
of uncertainty is key, as it allows for the informational and adverse selection dynamics
necessary for all of the results of the paper.
There are several strands of the theoretical literature that I interact with. The first is
that of uncertainty shocks. As proposed in Bloom (2009), and subsequently expanded
upon by many others (including Aghion et al. (2010); Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2010);
and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014)), downturns in output or investment can be
thought of as originating from spikes in macroeconomic uncertainty. The causality can
either run through the increased option value of waiting or (as in this work) the
increased cost of borrowing caused by higher credit spreads. I endogenize the
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connection between the actual event and the increase in uncertainty, while maintaining
flexibility and portability into macro settings.
The second strand is that of uncertainty being tied to rare disasters. Orlik and
Veldkamp (2014) shows that tail events (or even fear of tail events) can cause spikes in
real uncertainty. Cúrdia, Negro, and Greenwald (2014) show that fattening the tails on
the distribution of shocks has better results in matching data on volatility. There is also a
sizable literature in finance on the equity premium puzzle started by Rietz (1988), and
reinvigorated by Barro (2006), showing that a fear of tail events can generate excess
returns in equities. Learning models, such as Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and Cogley,
Matthes, and Sbordone (2011) take anticipated utility approaches. This paper differs in
three main respects from the rare events literature: First, there is no skewness in the
model - conditional uncertainty can arise from positive shocks as well as negative ones.
Second, there is no long-term Bayesian learning about the parameters of the economy.
Third, it treats the level of informedness as endogenous.
The third strand is that of market microstructure, informational asymmetries, and
imperfect price revelation. Hassan and Mertens (2014) use noise traders to create a
DSGE that results in imperfect price aggregation. Fishman and Parker (2015) study a
market where adverse selection can occur and lead to multiple equilibria. Bond,
Edmans, and Goldstein (2011) show transmission of price information from the financial
sector to the real economy. Kurlat (2010) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2012) show that
adverse selection can lead to illiquidity even when sellers offer at different prices.
Bookstaber and Pomerantz (1989) relates discrete information packet collection to
financial volatility. Routledge and Zin (2009) show that adverse selection can lead to
illiquidity when the market makers have uncertainty aversion. On the empirical side,
Bleaney and Li (2014) and Yip et al. (2002) show that adverse selection is an important
component of bid-ask spreads (with the latter finding that it is the single biggest
component). This paper draws on all of these different strands, but seeks to answer a
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fundamentally different type of question: What effects do rare shocks have on a financial
market as communicated through a particular market microstructure?
This paper also touches on the nature of information collection, as motivated by the
notion of inattention, as first brought to light by C. A. Sims (2003). Woodford (2012a)
provides neuro-scientific evidence that traditional formulations of rational inattention
are incompatible with actual attentional behavior, and proposes an alternative
formulation. This paper takes that alternative as a starting point; although the model
does not microfound agents’ attentional decisions, the motivation is to stay in step with
Woodford (2012a). An application of these methods to a macro setting is seen in
Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) to explore price stickiness, Paciello and Wiederholt
(2013) for optimal monetary policy, and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2010) to explore
sluggish responses. As in this paper, the only source of adjustment in Maćkowiak and
Wiederholt (2010) is attention. Matějka (2010) provides a host of results on price
dynamics for inattentive sellers. In finance, Mondria (2010) uses inattention to discuss
price comovement, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) looks at how
fund managers add value to clients, and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) match
portfolio selection patterns. Rational inattention is used in Maćkowiak and Wiederholt
(2011) along with limited liability and strategic complementarity in actions to get
inattention to rare events. I add to this burgeoning literature by using elements of
inattentive frameworks to address issues of uncertainty persistence.
The empirical section of this paper interacts with a large literature that wrestles with
forecasting the VIX. Additionally, there is a large literature on using the VIX to predict
stock returns, such as Bekaert and Hoerova (2014). The VIX forecasting literature focuses
in part on parametric estimation of factors that could predict the value of the VIX, and
formulates options trading strategies to profit off these predictions. Examples in this
literature are Ahoniemi (2008), Harvey and Whaley (1992), Brooks and Oozeer (2002),
and Konstantinidi, Skiadopoulos, and Tzagkaraki (2008). This paper does not address
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issues of trading strategy in its notion of forecasting - rather it is interested in
understanding movements in the VIX through a micro-founded understanding of the
rarity of price movements.
This paper can converse with the literature in self-exciting processes: papers such as
Aït-Sahalia, Cacho-Diaz, and Laeven (2015) and Aït-Sahalia, Laeven, and Pelizzon (2014)
construct models in which large jumps in one market can make jumps more likely in the
same market as well as in other markets. This paper can deliver similar results in beliefs,
though with an iid underlying process.
Finally, examples in the ‘pricing kernel puzzle’ literature are Chabi-Yo, Garcia, and
Renault (2008) who explain it with state dependence, and parametrically estimate a
model. Christoffersen, Heston, and Jacobs (2009) use a two factor model, and Ziegler
(2007) use heterogeneity of beliefs. More recently, Linn, Shive, and Shumway (2014) use
a new nonparametric estimator based on an assumption of stationarity in the sdf.
1.2 RARE EVENTS AND UNCERTAINTY
I present a simple model in this section, which formally introduces the underlying
mechanism through which rare events increase uncertainty.
1.2.1 Setup
The simple model has three types of agents, one period with three stages (0, 1, and 2),
and one asset. The agents are noise traders, informed traders, and market makers. Noise
traders function as hedgers - investors who are not sensitive to prices. Informed traders
function as speculators - investors who have an opinion over the future path of an
asset’s price and seek to profit from it. Market makers are intermediaries through which
noise traders and informed traders trade. In this model, the market maker provides a
friction that prevent buyers and sellers from interacting directly with each other over the
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course of the period. The model focuses on how informed traders collect information in
an imperfectly informative market, and how they use that information to exploit market
prices.
The simple model includes only one period, which allows clear identification of the
channel through which an unexpected event can lead to increases in uncertainty. Once
the mechanism for uncertainty is established, I will introduce dynamics in later sections
to explore uncertainty persistence. The three stages of this simple model correspond to,
in order: informational investment, informational payoff and trading, and accounting
and conclusion.
1.2.1.1 Asset
The asset has a stage 2 value that is comprised of two random variables: B, the value
of which is revealed in stage 1, and ηB, the value of which is revealed in stage 2. B can be
thought of as the ‘event’ - a price change for which investors can prepare. B is realized
and publicly revealed in stage 1, when it can take one of two values: H or L. In stage 0,
before B is revealed, all agents have a common prior distribution on the values of B:
P(B = H) = πH and P(B = L) = 1− πH = πL. If it is ex-ante unlikely for B to take the
value L, then πL will be small, and if B were revealed to equal L in stage 1, that could be
considered a rare event.
If B can be thought of as the ‘event,’ ηB can be thought of as the ‘reaction’ - a price
change that occurs upon the value of B realizing. Just as B indexes H and L, ηB indexes
two random variables: ηH and ηL. These two random variables are independent of one
another, and all agents know that each is distributed P(ηB = 1) = P(ηB = 0) = 0.5.
When B realizes in stage 1, the relevant variable ηB is determined, but it is not revealed
until stage 2. Only one of ηH and ηL will realize, as B will take the value H or L in stage
1. The structure of the asset is best seen in Figure 5.2.
The possible values of ηH and ηL are independent of one another. Although this
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assumption is not meant to be a pure reflection of reality in a financial market, it is used
here to illustrate that different macroeconomic events may affect asset prices through
different and not necessarily dependent channels. It is not important what the relative
value of H and L are; rather it is important that ηH and ηL are independent so that
collecting information about one does not help identify the value of the other.
1.2.1.2 Information
There are two types of information in this model: private and public. In stage 0,
informed traders can pay to invest in information about each ηB. The investment pays
off by giving agents information about ηB before it is revealed in stage 2, allowing them
to trade advantageously with respect to the asset’s terminal value: B + ηB. Investment in
a particular value of ηB is advantageous only if that value of B realizes, and provides no
benefit if a different value of B realizes. For example, investing in information about ηL
will prove useless if B = H. Therefore, agents must choose whether to be informed
about ηH, ηL, both or neither, knowing that only one informational investment will
actually pay off. In stage 1, agents who invested in the correct ηB will receive a perfectly
informative private signal about ηB’s value before it is publicly revealed in stage 2. This
information allows them to trade advantageously against the market makers, who only
have access to public information.
Public information about ηB in this model is exogenously given and constant across
values of B. In stage 1, a public signal about whether ηB is 1 or 0 is revealed to all agents
and has accuracy β ≥ 0.5. This means that
P(public signal = 1|ηB = 1) = P(public signal = 0|ηB = 0) = β. In later sections this
assumption will be relaxed, and public information will be allowed to vary across states.
Intuitively, allowing agents to purchase signals about ηB mirrors traders doing
research on conditional trading decisions for potential events. Theoretically, this
assumption is motivated by the inattention literature. For tractability, the full model of
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inattention is not treated here. A more rigorous treatment of inattention with the full
entropy formulation of Woodford (2012a) is provided in Appendix 5.3, which also
allows private agents to be risk averse. The results are quite similar.
1.2.1.3 Mechanics
Traders inhabit a unit continuum, a fraction T > 0 of which are noise traders. The
noise traders are defined by their behavior: Regardless of prices, half of the noise traders
always buy one unit of the asset and half always sell one unit of the asset. Their sole
purpose is to provide liquidity, and without them, the results of the simple model would
be degenerate. The model’s results are not very sensitive to the behavior of the noise
traders, and the choice described above is the simplest.
The remaining 1− T traders are risk-neutral informed traders. Informed traders
want information because information allows them to update their private valuations of
the asset and to trade advantageously with the market makers. In order to acquire
information, each trader can purchase a signal at cost c in stage 0. A signal gives perfect
information about ηB in stage 1 to the trader who bought it. If no signal is purchased, no
information is gained. After a trader has received her signal, she can choose to buy one
unit of the asset, sell one unit of the asset, or abstain from trade in stage 1. I limit asset
purchase decisions to the set {−1, 0, 1} and employ risk-neutrality for simplicity. If the
traders were risk-averse and had free volume choices it would not significantly change
the results of the model.
The market makers broker trades among noise and informed traders. They are
perfectly competitive. Market makers observe public information and set a bid and an
ask. A bid is the price at which the market maker is willing to buy the asset, and an ask
is the price at which the market maker is willing to sell the asset. Conversely, the bid is
the price at which traders can sell, and the ask at which traders can buy. All trade must
go through market makers - agents cannot trade directly with one another. In reality,
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most financial trade is carried out through intermediaries, so this assumption is not
unrealistic. The particular mathematical formulation of the market making sector I use
in this model is based off Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Their structure allows this paper
to analyze the effects of changes in public and private information. This type of sector
will preserve informational asymmetries and prevent price revelation.
Figure 5.3 shows the order of events of the simple model. In stage 0, agents decide
whether or not to purchase signals. In stage 1, B realizes and is publicly revealed.
Agents receive their private signals, and the public signal is revealed. The market
making sector sets a bid and an ask, and agents trade. In stage 2, ηB is publicly revealed
and agents receive their payoffs.
1.2.2 Solving the Model
The model is solved backwards. Stage 2 is trivial, as it is merely an accounting
exercise. The problems of interest are in stage 1 and stage 0.
1.2.2.1 Pricing
Consider the market makers’ stage 1 problem once the public signal has been
revealed and private signals have been seen by informed traders. Market makers see
that B has been revealed, so the terminal value of the asset will be B or B + 1. The
zero-profit conditions, as proven by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) are:
P(ηB = 1|buy order and MM Info) + B = ask
P(ηB = 1|sell order and MM Info) + B = bid
Since the public signal could be either 1 or 0, there are four potential prices that could be
set (two bids and two asks). These prices depend on the fraction s of informed agents
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that chose to buy the relevant signal in stage 0:
ask1 = B +
(
T∗(s)




2 + (1− T∗(s))β
(1.1)




2 + (1− T∗(s))(1− β)
(1.2)
ask0 = B +
(
T∗(s)




2 + (1− T∗(s))(1− β)
(1.3)




2 + (1− T∗(s))β
(1.4)
where T∗(s) = TT+s(1−T) . T
∗(s) can be thought of as the effective fraction of noise traders
because 1− s informed traders will not buy a signal and will abstain from trade.
The first two prices - ask1 and bid1 - correspond to those the market making sector
would set if the public signal were a 1 and the second two correspond to those the
market making sector would set if the public signal were a 0.4 All four prices will always
lie between B and B + 1 by definition. Further the ask will always be weakly larger than
the bid (otherwise there would be an arbitrage opportunity). The difference between the
bid and the ask is called the bid-ask spread, and is an indication of how much the
market making sector fears adverse selection.
An increase in T∗(s) due to fewer informed traders buying signals would narrow the
bid-ask spread because a higher percentage of noise traders reduces the adverse
selection problem faced by market makers. If no traders purchase signals, there would
be no adverse selection for market makers to protect against, and spreads would go to
zero. Conversely, because T > 0, all bids and asks will lie strictly between B and B + 1,
which means that perfectly informed traders have an incentive to buy or sell.
Knowing how prices will be calculated in stage 1, the signal acquisition problem of
4. If β = 0.5, then the public signal is completely uninformative and the two asks and the two bids would
equal one another.
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stage zero may be discussed.
1.2.2.2 Traders
Each trader faces an identical problem in stage 0. Conditional on the strength of β, the
trader decides whether purchase a signal for each ηB. The cost of acquiring a signal is
fixed at c for all values of B. The expected benefit of acquiring a signal for B, given
values T and πB is:
πB
2
[β(1− ask1(s)) + (1− β)(1− ask0(s)) + (1− β)(bid1(s)) + β(bid0(s))] (1.5)
where an individual trader takes s as given in making her decision. Recall that πB
reflects the probability that the state for which the signal is bought will occur and thus
the probability that the signal will be useful. β represents the probability that the public
signal will be correct. If traders see through their private signal that ηB = 1, then they
will buy at the ask, which is lower than B + 1; if they see that ηB = 0, they will sell at the







2 + (1− T∗(s))(1− βB)
) (
T∗(s)
2 + (1− T∗(s))
) − c
 (1.6)
The above expression shows that the agent is more likely to acquire a signal if, all else
being equal, πB ↑, c ↓, T∗(s) ↑ or β ↓. As πB increases, there is a higher likelihood that
the agent will benefit from identifying ηB, and as a result, agents will buy signals for
higher likelihood states. Although a simple case, this model shows that less likely states
are less likely to attract informed agents, as the cost of acquiring a signal in a state is not
correlated with the probability of that state occurring. Similarly as the cost of purchasing
a signal decreases, more agents will invest in information generally. As T∗(s) increases,
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bid-ask spreads will decline due to a reduction in the adverse selection problem, but the
informativeness of the price will not change. Therefore, the expected profit of being
informed will increase, as the prices at which agents can trade are more attractive. As β
increases, market makers can still set tighter spreads, as the level of adverse selection has
gone down, but now prices are more accurate. Therefore information is less valuable to
traders and so a signal is less likely to be purchased. This means that public and private
information are strategic substitutes.
An equilibrium, given a value of β, is defined as a set of prices {ask, bid}, and a
purchase decision Pur ∈ {1, 0,−1} that satisfy equations (1.1)-(4), and a set of purchase
decisions {buy, don’t buy} by the measure (1− T) informed traders that satisfy
equation (1.6) in stage 0.
1.2.3 Key Predictions
Given the equilibrium definitions, there are two key propositions:
Proposition 1. s∗, the equilibrium fraction of informed traders who purchase a signal, is
non-decreasing in πB.
Proposition 2. For any given c, there is a sufficiently low πB ∈ (0, 1) such that all traders will
not buy a signal for state B.
All proofs of propositions and corollaries are in Appendix 5.1). These results follow
directly from equation (1.6), and illustrate the key mechanism of this section: as the
probability of a state goes down, agents are less informed on average upon its
occurrence. Further, there is always a sufficiently unlikely state such that all agents will
be uninformed when it occurs.
This model was set up to uncover the mechanism under which low probability events
can trigger spikes in uncertainty. As is evident, private signals are more likely to be
purchased when the probability of the state increases. These propositions show that
when rare events occur, uncertainty increases through an informational investment
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mechanism. The structure that drives this result is that the value of investment varies
with the ex-ante probability of the state, but the cost of investment does not. As a result,
rare events result in poor signal quality, lower levels of information, and uncertainty.
1.3 RARE EVENTS AND PERSISTENCE
I will now extend the simple model to multiple periods to show how uncertainty can
persist endogenously. Informational investment is the inter-temporal choice variable,
and will be the only inter-temporal aspect of the model. I will not consider consumption
smoothing, investment adjustment costs, or other such methods. As seen in the previous
section, investment in information can affect trading decisions today. As we will see in
this section, information investment today can also affect informational investment
decisions tomorrow. This multi-period model will test how much an informational
investment mechanism can cause uncertainty to persist.
1.3.1 Dynamic Model
Suppose that the model described in the previous section runs for many periods, each
of which has three stages to match the initial setup . I will assume that informational
investment in time t impacts not only agents’ beliefs over ηB in time t, but also agents’
beliefs over B in time t + 1. In order to find the distribution of Bt+1 given Bt, ηB,t and
choices by private traders, assume that Bt+1 = Bt + ηB + ut+1. That is, the value of B in
period t + 1 is simply the terminal value of the asset in period t, plus a noisy variable u.
This variable exists so that, at the outset of each period, agents do not know which value
B will take, and the structure of informational investment can be used again. A trader’s
information investment decision in one period is affected by the informational
investment decision of the period before. As before, the underlying process of the asset
is not dependent on decisions by agents, but the distributions agents have over the
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variables that define the asset are dependent on the agents’ decisions.
For the rest of the theoretical section, I will simplify the signal acquisition process.
Instead of heterogenous agents making individual decisions to acquire information, I
will use a representative agent who either acquires a signal or does not. This agent could
be thought of as a single trader purchasing information and then commanding power in
the market equal to a share 1− T of trade, or as a way to enforce a symmetric
decision-making among a continuum of traders. As shown in Appendix 5.2, this
simplification has no effect on the utility of traders in the static or dynamic version of the
model, and it eliminates additional unstable equilibria in the dynamic version. Since
characterizing the nature of these equilibria is not a priority of this paper, introducing a
representative agent allows focus on the result of changes in signal quality across states
rather than the result of changes across agents within a state.
As with ηB, the agent can receive a signal about u with an accuracy determined by the
signal acquisition decision. πt+1 = 0.5 if the agent does not buy a signal and
πt+1 = k > 0.5 if the agent does buy a signal. To simplify notation, I will define
πt ≡ max{πH, πL}. The representative trader now needs to solve the following problem
given a value of β:




πβ(1− β) T2( T
2 + (1− T)(1− β)
) ( T
2 + (1− T)
) − c + δπV(k, 1− k), δπV(0.5, 0.5)}
(1.7)
In the multi-period case, there are two effects: Selecting a signal impacts trade of the
asset in t, but it also impacts information collection in t + 1. Now, a signal is more
valuable, as it has long term informativeness as well as short. I have deliberately
separated the long term and short term effects of signal acquisition, although they could
have been combined without much trouble. By separating them, we can see that
reduction of noise in η is useful to agents because it allows them to trade
advantageously against market makers, and reduction of noise in u is useful because it
allows agents to collect information more efficiently going forward.
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The definition of a dynamic equilibrium for a given β and k in stage 0 is the
representative trader’s choice to buy a signal or not to satisfy equation (1.7) and a choice
of prices by market makers to satisfy equation (1.1)-(4).
1.3.1.1 Information
The multi-period model produces uncertainty persistence because a trader’s lack of
information in one period carries forward into future periods. This is best shown
through the step-wise incentive structure that informed traders face for different costs of
information. At the extremes, if information is cheap and c is close to 0, traders will
always purchase a signal, as it costlessly provides information. Conversely, if
information is exorbitantly expensive and c goes to infinity, traders will never purchase a
signal, and V(π, 1− π) = 0 for all π. In between, there are two intermediate thresholds:
1. Purchase signals for state B if πB = k and if πB = 0.5 but not if πB = 1− k. In this
case, the agent will be perfectly informed until the unlikely state occurs, at which
point they will be uninformed. Recall that when no signal is purchased, πt+1 = 0.5.
Once they reach this state, they will purchase signals for both (now equiprobable
states in t + 1) and uncertainty will last for only one period.
2. Purchase signals for state B if πB = k but not if πB = 0.5 or πB = 1− k. In this case
the agent will be perfectly informed until the unlikely state occurs, at which point
they will be permanently uninformed. This type of persistence is a stark version of
what will be developed in the next section.
Proposition 3. For any β and any πt ∈ (0, 1), there is a sufficiently high value of c, such that
the private trader will not purchase a signal and πt+1 = 0.5.
Corollary 1. There is a threshold c such that if πt = 0.5 and c > c, πt+1 = 0.5.
Proposition 3 shows that for sufficiently high costs, or equivalently, for sufficiently
rare events, signal quality is poor, and the ex-ante distribution of Bt+1 will be disperse.
The corollary shows that there is a cost such that the agent will not choose to buy a
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signal for π = 0.5. Thus, for certain threshold cost, if an event occurs with a very low
probability (1− k), the agent will be permanently uninformed thereafter.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the function describe in this section. The x-axis corresponds to
periods of time. The y-axis is the degree of uncertainty faced by agents over ηB. The red
vertical lines correspond to events that occur with a low ex-ante probability. In the first
panel, the agent purchases signals when πt = 0.5 and when πt = k, but not when
πt = 1− k. When rare events occur, the agent is uncertain, faces a uniform distribution
in the next period, and is able to purchase signals to guarantee certainty in the following
period. In the right panel, the agent only purchases signals when πt = 1− k. An initial
rare event makes the agent uncertain, and when she faces a uniform distribution, she can
no longer buy signals, and is trapped in uncertainty forever.
Intuitively, the nature of the model’s trap can be related to the real world as follows:
one could imagine an investor trying to make informational investment decisions about
sporting events in a tournament in order to place bets. Sporting events have binary
outcomes, so it is a natural point of comparison to the simple model. Suppose that early
in the tournament, a low quality team plays a high quality team. The high quality team
is expected to win, so an investor spends more time researching and simulating the high
quality team’s chances in potential future games. If the low quality team wins, the
investor will not have as much information about how the low quality team will perform
in future games and may not have the time or energy to do additional research. As a
result, the investor will not have strong enough opinions to place bets for the subsequent
round and as a result, will not do research about either team to predict the outcomes of
the rounds that follow. The investor might choose, after an initial upset, not to place any
additional bets for the rest of the tournament - the effort it would take become informed
about future outcomes outweighs the potential benefit of making informed bets.
The starkness of the result of this simple model - that uncertainty can be a trap that
lasts forever - can be attributed to the binary nature of the simple model. In an
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all-or-nothing investment framework, it is possible to get permanent non-investment.
The simple model shows that agents will choose to be uninformed if their distributions
are sufficiently uniform - if there are too many events that could potentially occur, it is
not worth paying attention to any single one. As we will see in the following section,
once informational investment decisions are made freely, uncertainty will persist, but it
will not become permanent.
1.4 GENERAL SETUP AND REAL EFFECTS
The simple model generates spikes and persistence in uncertainty, but it has stark
predictions, due to the all-or-nothing form of informational investment. This section
loosens the assumptions of the model to allow for more nuanced predictions. The
analytical results of Section 1.2 continue to hold. Additionally, the assumptions of
Section 1.3 are loosened, and instead of uncertainty traps that last forever, the general
model delivers uncertainty persistence. Relaxing the structure of informational
investment, the state space, and the nature of public information allows for a richer set
of predictions about dispersion of beliefs and asset-demand, as well as implications for
volatility and bid-ask spreads, which are illustrated by some non-calibrated simulations.
1.4.1 Structure
The structure of the economy will generalize to permit richer dynamics and
predictions, and set up a link between the financial market and the real economy. To that
latter end, I will now include two additional sectors: a perfectly competitive continuum
of firms, and a perfectly competitive credit sector. As before, there are many periods.
Within each period there are again three stages. In stage 0 the representative agent
decides how accurate future signals should be. In stage 1, the public signal of the asset’s
value is revealed, firms borrow, prices are set, and financial trade occurs. In stage 2, the
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final value of the asset is revealed, firms produce, and agents purchase and consume.
1.4.2 Asset
There are, as before, two components of the asset, Bt and ηB,t, and the terminal value
of the asset in stage 2 is Vt = Bt + ηB,t. Bt ∼ N(µB,t, σ2B,t) and ηB,t ∼ N(0, σ2η) for each B.
In stage 0, neither Bt nor ηB,t is known, but µB,t, σ2B,t, and σ
2
η are all known. In stage 1, B
is publicly revealed, and private and public signals about the realization of ηB,t, with
accuracy σ2γ,t and σ
2
β,t, respectively, are gathered as well. In stage 2, ηB,t is revealed and
the gains and losses are realized. The data-generating process is a random walk:
µB,t+1 = Vt + εt+1, where εt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2ε ). At the beginning of stage 0 of period t + 1 a
signal ut+1 is revealed that is distributed N(εt+1, σ2u,t+1) where σu,t+1 ∝ σγ,t. One
advantage of generalizing the asset’s structure is that the model can view forecasts of the
asset’s value as continuous distributions, which allows a quick relation, empirically, to
the VIX.
1.4.3 Stage 2 Problems
The model will again be solved backwards, and now the problems in stage 2 require
some detail.
1.4.3.1 Traders
The representative trader in stage 2 now maximizes a utility function which is based







Where ct(ω) is the consumption of good ω at time t, ρ is a measure of substitutability,
and S is money holdings for the next period. The first order conditions yield that the the
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The traders are always wealthy enough that their demand for goods does not suffer
wealth effects (that is, wealth is high enough that St > 0 always - alternatively, one could
assume that traders can carry over negative money holdings between periods). The only
variation in St will come from the amount gained/lost in the stock market between
stages 1 and 2 by financial activity. Given their stage-2 utility, traders are risk-neutral in
their financial market participation. With this structure, the model can divorce firms’
problems from the traders’ financial issues. That is, the assumption makes the structure
of the economy linear, as opposed to co-dependent.
1.4.3.2 Firms




At ptqα0,t − (1 + rt)qt − f s.t. q0,t ≤ qt (1.10)
where q0,t is the amount of capital used in production (it must be weakly less than the
amount borrowed), At is productivity, rt is the pre-determined cost of borrowing, and f
is a fixed cost of operating. Assume that At is directly correlated with Vt (conversely one
could have assumed an input price was correlated with V). Given agents’ demand, the
operating profit for the firm is determined by:




















α+ρ−2 , the optimal level of capital desired ex-post. The three terms of
the maximization are in turn: the option to default, the option to use all of the loan if the
firm has borrowed weakly less than its optimal amount, and the option to use less than
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all of the loan, if the firm has borrowed more than its optimal amount.
1.4.3.3 Creditors
Creditors’ returns depend on firms’ outcomes:





















The creditor will receive the first argument of the minimum if the firm does not default.
If the firm does default the creditor will receive the firm’s profits, which are defined as
the maximum in the firm’s problem. kc is the proportional loss in value upon default,
and is used to proxy bankruptcy costs.
1.4.4 Stage 1 Problems
σβ,t(Bt) is the accuracy of the public signal about ηB,t conditional on a realization of
Bt, and σγ,t(Bt) is the accuracy of private signals about ηB,t for every Bt. Then the ex-post




















Traders have access to private and public information and, as they are risk neutral,
will choose to buy one unit of the asset if their private mean lies above the ask and will
sell one unit of the asset if their private mean lies below the bid. One can think of this
problem in two different ways: first, that the representative trader receives one signal
and is able to make a choice between buying 1− T units, selling 1− T units, or
abstaining; or second, that the a continuum of 1− T traders each make individual signals
based off of idiosyncratic signals purchased on their behalf by the representative trader
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in stage 0. The two cases are mathematically equivalent ex-ante to risk-neutral agents.
U(public signal, private signal) = max {(bidt − x), (x− askt), 0} (1.13)










. Traders’ decisions in
stage 1 are independent of those in stage 2, and are not inter-temporal.
1.4.4.2 Prices
Market makers have access to all public information about the asset and also know
the function σγ(B). The dispersion of private beliefs (assuming the signal is purchased








Conditional on a realization of B, a public mean µp, a public variance σ2p, and a
dispersion of beliefs σ2disp,t, the expected profits for a choice of a bid and an ask by the



















where φp,t ∼ N(µp,t, σ2p,t) and φdisp,x ∼ N







means that the bid and the ask must be selected to set the profits above to zero.
1.4.4.3 Creditors
Creditors are perfectly competitive, risk-neutral, and set a credit supply function that
nets them zero profit in expectation. For a given level of borrowing, q, and risk-free rate
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r f the credit supply function is:
∫
φp(x)ΠC(x, qt, rt)dx = (1 + r f ,t)qt (1.16)
Essentially, the expected return to the creditors must equal the return from investing in a
risk-free asset. rt is a function of µp, σp, and r f .
1.4.4.4 Firms
Firms also must make zero profits in expectation, and so:
∫
φp(x)ΠF(x, qt, rt)dx = 0 (1.17)
this is the credit-demand equation. qt is a function of µp, σp, and r f .
1.4.5 Stage 0 Problems
In stage 0, conditional private and public signals are selected.
1.4.5.1 Traders
The asset’s value follows a random walk process both within and between periods.
Within a period, the increment is ηt and between periods it is εt. The noise with which
the public signals about η and ε are observed are proportional to one another. Traders










p(public signal = x)(p(private signal = y) (1.18)




































Proposition 4. ∂U∂σγ < 0.
Corollary 2. For any given c, ∀δ > 0, if σ′β(B) = 0, then
∂σ∗γ(B)
∂φ(B) ≤ 0.
This result confirms the intuition from Proposition 2 holds: attention is a good, albeit
a costly one. As such, more attention is paid to higher probability states than to low
probability states. Therefore, lower probability events reduce identification and increase
uncertainty.
Corollary 3. For any given c, ∀δ > 0, if σ′β(B) = 0, then for any two points B1 and B2, such
that wlog, φB,t(B1) > φB,t(B2). Then at time t + 1, EB1 [φB,t+1(B)] > EB2 [φB,t(B)].
The rarer the event that occurs, the longer the subsequent uncertainty is likely to last.
There is an upper bound on how uncertain the agents can be, as ση < ∞ and σε < ∞, so
even though σγ and σβ are unbounded, the variance of the posterior distributions are
bounded.
1.4.6.1 Public
It was shown in the simple model that public and private information are substitutes.
Therefore, it would be of interest to find out whether deteriorating public information
changes private traders’ incentives. To analyze this, I introduce a public entity who
chooses the quality of public information to maximize a given objective function (the
particular function is not very important, so long public information is treated as a
good).
The public entity works to select conditional signal quality, σβ for each potential value
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everywhere. The variance of the distribution over which the public entity solves its
problem is time-invariant. One could say that the representative agent reveals the mean
of her distribution to the public agent, but not the variance of signal. Initial simulations
seem to show that the loosening of this restriction does not change much, but full
simulation work is ongoing.
The public entity seeks to be accurate, but the particular objective function is not
overly important. One could think of the public information as being reports or actions
from public institutions like the Federal Reserve or the government, or research reports
published by financial institutions. An alternative asymmetric objective is considered in
the appendix, to show that the particular choice of objective is not driving the results.
These changes in the structure of public information no longer allow us to describe
patterns analytically, but simulations still permit insight into the dynamics.
1.4.6.2 Equilibrium
Given values of {µB,t, σ2B,t, c, cp, σ2η,t, σ2ε,t}, a dynamic equilibrium is defined by a choice
of σβ by the public entity that solves equation 1.19 a choice of a policy function
σγ(µB, σ2B, σ
2
β) by the traders that satisfies equation 1.18, conditional on a choice qt by
Firms to solve equation 1.17, a choice of rt by Creditors to solve equation 1.16, individual
decisions to buy, sell, or abstain by traders to solve equation 1.13, prices pt and rt, and a
choice of a bid and an ask by Market Makers to solve equations 1.14 and clear the goods
and credit markets, given observed values of {σβ,t, σγ,t, Bt, r f ,t, ση,t}, a public signal, and
a set of private signals distributed N(ηt, σ2η,t). .
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1.4.7 Predictions and Spillovers
Figure 5.5 shows the results of the previous propositions. In this snapshot,5 one can
see how agents (both public and private) choose to invest in information. The blue
dashed line is the ex-ante distribution of B. Then, conditional on these selections, one
can see what the expectations for credit spreads, levels of borrowing, demand for
financial assets, bid-ask spreads, uncertainty, volatility, and dispersion of beliefs are for
each potential value of B.
As is expected by the propositions above, both σβ and σγ are U-shaped, with better
signal quality for high probability states and worse signal quality for low probability
states.
The results of these attentional choices are shown in panel (c). Most importantly here,
uncertainty and volatility both spike for tail events. But it is important to note that
bid-ask spreads, and dispersion of beliefs also are higher for tail events, and are
comparatively lower for higher probability events. This bears out the first hypothesis in
the introduction - that attentional choices, or investment in information ex-ante can lead
to spikes in second moments that are reflected in a financial setting. Similarly panel (d)
shows that volume of trade, or balance sheet size, or leverage, plummets for tail events
as investors are less well informed in those states and therefore less likely to want to take
on risk.
The transmission of these effects to the real economy is also evident in panel (b). The
‘counter cyclicality’ of credit spreads is preserved here, as negative shocks result in
higher credit spreads than positive ones, although spreads for rare positive shocks are
still slightly higher than for ‘normal’ events.
5. The parameter values here are µB,t = 10, σ2η = 4, σ2ε = 4, cp = 0.0002, δ = 0.95, c = 1, r f = 0.03,
ρ = 0.6, α = 0.6, kc = k f = 0, and νp(x) = ν(x) = 1x . α and ρ are selected with the calibration of section 5
in mind, while ση and σε are set equal to indicate that the uncertainty from period to period is not more or
less than stage to stage. The rest of the parameters will deliver similar results.
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1.4.8 Real and Financial Persistence
The above was an illustration of the comparative statics. Consider now the effect of
the persistence mechanism. In Figure 5.6 the asset’s value takes a three standard
deviation drop in period 2 and then immediately rebounds in period 3 to its prior level,
where it then remains for several periods.
There are several aspects of this figure of note: first, the large drop in the asset’s value
corresponds to a low-probability event ex-ante, and therefore large increases in all the
financial variables (drop in asset demand); second the rebound is just as large in size as
the drop, but due to the flattening of the distribution in period 2, it actually lowers
uncertainty somewhat - as uncertainty increases agents’ ex-ante beliefs about the
likelihood of large price movements; third, as the asset’s value does not move at all after
period 3, the only source of persistence is the time it takes for agent’s confidence in their
forecasts to regain shape (for the variance of their beliefs to decline).
The spillover into the real economy can also be seen as credit spreads also spike and
take time to decline, which causes output to stay below its initial value for several
periods.
1.5 TAKING THE MODEL TO DATA
The model of this paper addresses the nature of informational investment. It has
delivered three key predictions that I will now attempt to evaluate empirically.
First, propositions (2) and (4) both state low probability events lead to lower levels of
information. The effects of these lower levels of information manifest in higher levels of
uncertainty. Therefore, I first document that low probability events do lead to spikes in
uncertainty.
Proposition (3) provides an explanation for the persistence of uncertainty - namely
that more disperse beliefs lead to worse informational investment on average. I show
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that an initial low probability event flattens future probability distributions, which in
conjunction with the first result, provides a channel for persistence.
Finally, and perhaps most illustratively, I use the model and actual S&P price changes
to see how well the model can forecast values of the VIX, dispersion, risk taking and
credit spreads. In Appendix 5.4 I provide some evidence that the channels through
which the above effects take place is preparedness, as measured by a function of how
well a representative consumer is hedged against different price movements.
1.5.1 Rare Events Trigger Uncertainty
First, I show that lower probability events cause higher levels of uncertainty. These
are the predictions of Propositions (2) and (4).
1.5.1.1 Strategy
The first hurdle is deciding how to measure the probabilities of events. The seminal
work of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) allows recovery the ex-ante probabilities of
price movements from options data. They show that the double derivative of call option
prices on a range of strike prices gives the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities along the
same range.6 Taking the shortest horizon and the full set of strikes of call options, I
construct a vector of implied volatilities, which I use to price one-day options. The
double-difference of those one-day options yield a probability distribution over price
movements in the following trading day.
A concern might arise from this methodology. Due to risk-aversion present in the
market, the options data may be overestimating the probability of negative events and
6. Of course, given the relative illiquidity of options markets, the data needs to be cleaned and prepared
in order to apply this method. Starting with daily options prices for the S&P index from January 2nd, 1996
to March 15th, 2015, which totals about 5 million data points, I then eliminate, in order, the prices that
allow the following arbitrage opportunities: (1) If the bid-ask spread on a particular security was negative.
(2) If it was possible to buy and immediate exercise an option for profit. (3) If the value of options were
not monotonic in the strikes. (4) If the double difference (price of Arrow-Debreu securities) were negative.
After these adjustments there are about 2.5 million prices left. These are then arranged each into implied
volatility surfaces, and I use a spline to interpolate between strikes and maturities.
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underestimating the probability of positive events. This would bias coefficients in any
potential regression. To account for this, I also calculate the probabilities using the
physical distribution based on fitting a nonparametric kernel density estimator to a
physical distribution based on a moving window of historical largest intraday price
movements using the novel method of Botev, Grotowski, Kroese, et al. (2010).
Effectively, using a density of data acquired in a historical window (the results of this
exercise are not very sensitive to the size of the window), the kernel density estimator is
formed by assuming a linear-diffusion process (such as, in a simple case, the heat
equation). There is then an estimator for each value of t, as the process gradually
diffuses completely to its limiting distribution. The algorithm is a two-state process,
which first models the dissipation of heat into a space of uniform diffusivity. This
diffusion process depends on the nature of the data, and so the second stage again
models dissipation but with nonuniform diffusivity, learned from the first stage. See
Ramsey (2014) for an excellent summary.
A second hurdle is deciding how to measure financial uncertainty. The VIX is a
measure constructed by the Chicago Board of Exchange to measure, based off of options
prices, the market’s expectation of volatility of the S&P index in the next 30 days,
reported in annualized percentage terms. This metric reflects the market’s uncertainty
over future price paths, and so will serve as a useful proxy for uncertainty. Therefore, the
regression that we’re interested in will take the following form:
∆ log(VIXt) = α0 + α1∆ log(Probt) + α2∆ log(Xt) + εt (1.20)
Probt is the minimum of a vector with two values: the probabilities of the highest and
lowest intraday values of the S&P during day t as calculated in the two methods
discussed above. VIXt is the closing value of the VIX index on day t. The hypothesis is
that α1 should be negative. Furthermore since the VIX and other control variables in this
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regression are serially correlated7, the regression will be run in first differences of logs
and will report Newey-West standard errors. Xt is a vector of control variables, such as
the value of the S&P index, the volume of trade in the index, and the intraday volatility
of the index, which should alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias. Additionally, I
include the Skewness of the VIX in the control group, just to add a more rigorous test of
the claim in the introduction, that the Skewness and level of the VIX are not positively
correlated.
I use a standard set of regressors augmented with the probabilities. The value of
controls such as the underlying and the volume of trade has been used to explain
implied volatility by such papers as Simon (2003), Harvey and Whaley (1992), Franks
and Schwartz (1991), and Fleming, Ostdiek, Whaley, et al. (1995). This regression is
novel in that previous work have not tested the effect of the ex-ante probabilities on
ex-post implied volatility.
1.5.1.2 Data
All options price data comes from WRDS. From 1996 to 2015 it includes daily closing
bids, closing asks, implied volatilities, for all listed options on the S&P index by strike
and maturity. I also have daily opening and closing values of the VIX from Yahoo!. All
summary statistics are reported in table 5.1.
1.5.1.3 Results
Before we turn to the regression results, Figure 5.7 is a useful way of looking at the
data. For each day, I have a probability of the intraday high point and a probability of
the intraday low point. I take the minimum of those two probabilities, and arrange those
along the x-axis as follows: the left half of the x-axis are all the days on which the
intraday low was less likely than the intraday high. The low point probabilities are
7. As decided by Dickey-Fuller tests on each variable.
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arranged from least likely to most likely. On the right half are all the days on which the
intraday high was less likely than the intraday low. The high point probabilities are
arranged from most likely to least likely. This is to mimic the x-axis seen in the graphs in
section 4.6. Then corresponding to each probability I take the closing value of the VIX
index for each day. As is visible from the fitted quadratic curve, the basic shape of the
VIX seems to mimic that of σγ.
As is evident from the table, and as was expected, the coefficients on the minimum
probability and its lags are all negative in all columns. The results of the table are robust
to many other control variables, and seem to confirm the finding of the model that
ex-ante low probability events are followed by spikes in the VIX. Importantly, the spikes
in uncertainty cannot solely be caused by the magnitude of the change in the S&P itself,
nor in changes in volatility, as they are being controlled for. In terms of magnitude, a one
percent increase in the size of intraday volatility increases the VIX by about 0.01 percent.
On the other hand a one percent increase in the size of the probability of an event
decreases the VIX by about 0.002 percent. This may seem small, but probabilities can
fluctuate wildly, and can drop or increase many-fold in a day. This non-linearity is
precisely why it is beneficial to look at this regression in log terms. Very rare events will
be orders of magnitude smaller than the norm, and so will significantly increase the VIX.
It is also important to note that the Skew coefficient is negative and significant, indicating
that a fear of large negative events is not positively correlated with overall uncertainty.
Touching on the issue of causality here, an alternative hypothesis to the one posited
here is that a rare event may in fact spike uncertainty, and that the spike in uncertainty is
what causes large price fluctuations. The lagged terms should allay this concern
somewhat, as an unlikely price movement not only impacts today’s VIX but tomorrow’s
as well. However, the idea that an increase in uncertainty makes large price fluctuations
more likely, is very much in step with the predictions of the model. The flattening of a
distribution, referred to often here, means that not only does the center of a distribution
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get depressed, but the tails fatten somewhat as well, thus harking back to the
‘self-exciting’ process mentioned earlier. The model posits that both directions of
causality are valid, but that timing is crucial - one rare event causes a flattening, which in
turn may cause more events to be ill-identified.
1.5.2 Propagation
The next step tests whether the data is consistent with the model’s explanation of
persistence, namely, Proposition 3 and Corollary 3. Are spikes in uncertainty correlated
with flattened distributions and lower future probabilities? This is a statistical test of a
correlation as opposed to a causal argument. This test, in conjunction with the previous
section’s results, should display the desired patterns of uncertainty: namely a rare event
spikes uncertainty, which in turn lowers the probabilities of price movements on
average, thus raising future uncertainty in expectation.
1.5.2.1 Strategy
The previous section showed that the lower the probability of a price movement, the
larger the increase in the VIX. Therefore, in order to justify the model’s predictions, I
must further show that increases in the level of the VIX flatten that period’s probability
distribution. I will test this by showing that given a pdf, p(·) over S&P price movements,
an increase in the VIX will have four effects: first it will lower max(p); second it will
lower Ep[p], third it will lower Ep[p2]; and fourth, that the effect of volatility on p is
always negative. Intuitively, these four effects are that the likelihood of the most likely
price movement declines, that the ‘average’ probability of price movements decline, that
the dispersion of probabilities of price movements declines (thus showing that the effect
also has the self-exciting aspect mentioned earlier) and finally that large price
movements are not expected. All four of these results are consistent with a flattening of
the probability distribution. The fourth additionally rules out potential alternative
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hypothesis such as bimodal or multimodal distributions, that could also be associated
with increases in the VIX.
The last section already created a time series for p across strikes. I use the risk-neutral
probabilities - the results are similar for the physical distribution, but since those
distributions are already smoothed, by the kernel density estimator method, it is less
surprising that those distributions would follow the patterns laid out. For each day, I
normalize the state space of p by the opening value of the S&P index, in order to create a
method of uniform comparison. Then I create three time series: one called max which is
the maximum value of p(·), one called avg, which is defined as Ep[p(·)], and one called
stdev, which is defined as Ep[p2]. All three of these variable would take their maximum
value when p is a point mass, and their minimum value when p is uniform across all
strikes, and therefore provide measures of flatness. Finally, I regress volatility on the
minimum probabilities of the intraday highs and lows:
probt = φ0 + φ1volatilityt + εt
This metric shows how large price changes are expected. One possible alternative theory
to the pure flattening of the distribution, is that the VIX goes up in value, because
investors have bimodal expectations: they expect a period of higher volatility. If φ1 is
negative and significant for each quantile, that would be evidence against multi-modal
expectations, as large price changes would continue to be less expected than small ones.
I calculate the four variables above for 32 different quantiles of the VIX index, where
each quantile contains 150 observations. Then I plot their values with confidence
intervals against the quantiles, and also regress them as well to provide visual and
statistical evidence that the relationships are as anticipated.
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1.5.2.2 Results
As is evident from Figure 5.9, there is a strong negative relationship between the level
of the VIX, and all of the measures of flattening described above. Further, Table 5.4 bears
out this visual relationship statistically. The table indicates that a large movement in the
VIX (of say, 10 quantiles) reduces the max probability by 1%, and the average probability
by 0.6%, while the graphs show that the average probability declines by almost half over
all quantiles.
Therefore, this empirical test, along with the tests of the effect of low probability
events, shows that the data is consistent with the predictions of the model: lower
probability events will increase the level of uncertainty, which in turn flattens out the
distribution, making future price movements less likely, thus repeating the cycle and
making uncertainty persistent.
1.5.3 Simulation and Forecasting
This section of the paper is devoted to testing how well the mechanisms described
can actually match empirical patterns. To that end, all of the variables in the model have
some real world parallel, that they can be calibrated to, with the exception of the costs of
informational investment. Therefore, this section will calibrate all of the variables
possible, and then estimate values of c and cp that allow predicted uncertainty to come
closest to the VIX.
1.5.3.1 Strategy
The list of variables that need to be calibrated are:
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Variable Value Source/Justification
µB,t S&P Index –
σ2η 23% –
σ2u 23% –
ρ 45 Hassan and Mertens (2014)
α 0.34 Hassan and Mertens (2014)
r f ,t Federal Funds Rate –
f 0.67 Fiedler (2012)
δ 0.95 –
T 0.38 Wang (2002)
kc 0.3 Kozlowski, Veldkamp, and Venkateswaran (2015)
The VIX is directly tied to the S&P index. Therefore the asset in the model will track
the value of the index. Both ση and σu will be measured in percentage terms, in order to
match the units of the VIX. However, unlike the VIX, the uncertainty will not be
‘annualized’ but will be period-by-period - and therefore the reported VIX will be
divided by the square root of 12. Calibration for capital utilization, elasticity of
substitution, the risk free rate, the cost of bankruptcy and the fixed cost of production are
only relevant for the computation of credit spreads, and the values here are not overly
important. The risk-free rate is taken to be the federal funds rate, which is the overnight
rate as opposed to a monthly rate, but the results again are not sensitive to changes here.
For an estimate of fixed cost, I use Fiedler (2012), which compares fixed to variable costs,
and come up with an approximate ratio of the two, which allows me to estimate the
fixed cost in this model at 0.67. The discount factor is set at 0.95, and the ratio of noise
traders is taken from Wang (2002) who measures the volume and number of noise
traders in foreign exchange markets. Data on this variable is difficult to come by, but
thankfully its value not crucial in estimation.
Then the model takes the parameters above as inputs, and the previous period’s
maximum price change, and the previous period’s VIX (either estimated or actual) and
outputs uncertainty, calculated as Var[η|private and public information]. There are two
simulations, in the first, the VIX each period is updated to its correct value in order to
predict the next period’s value (PbP); in the second, the actual value of the VIX is only
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input in the first period, and only price changes are input thereafter (PC).
Forecast Mean Var
VIX 6.12 5.19
VIX PbP 5.29 4.21
VIX PC 5.57 5.98
In order to construct a baseline for comparison, I also consider a naive forecaster, who
uses the previous period’s largest percentage deviation as the prediction for the next
period’s VIX. Additionally, given the inputs, I am also able to construct simulations for
the path of credit spreads, the path of risk-taking, and the path of dispersion of beliefs.
These can also be compared to actual time-series from the data.
1.5.3.2 Results
As is evident from Figure 5.10, the paths of the simulated VIXs and the actual VIX
seem relatively close to one another, all spiking in the same places. Some summary
statistics for the forecasts are below, the two simulations have a lower mean squared
error and a higher R2 than the naive forecast.
Forecast MSE R2
Monthly PbP 2.88 0.476
Monthly PC 2.46 0.525
Monthly Naive 13.27 0.245
Further using a Diebold-Mariano test on the vectors of squared errors of each of the
forecasts, we see that the best forecast is PC, followed by PbP, followed by the naive
forecast. The intuition of the two sets of simulations from the last section should be
evident here - the spikes after periods of large price movements, and the subsequent
slow return to previous levels merely build on earlier intuition. Additionally, we can see
in Figure 5.11 the forecasts (in blue and red) for credit spreads, dispersion of beliefs, and




Credit Spread PbP 0.03 0.195
Credit Spread PC 0.04 0.069
Dispersion PbP 87.02 0.138
Dispersion PC 39.06 0.155
Debt Margin PbP 4.64 0.445
Debt Margin PC 4.77 0.394
Using only price changes in the S&P index, and an initial value of the VIX, the model
is able to give predictions about these variables that, while not identical, still match the
general shapes of each, and explain significant fractions of their variance.
1.6 PRICING KERNEL PUZZLE
If an agent purchases an asset, then her wealth increases in the value of an asset. One
would expect then, that her stochastic discount factor would monotonically decrease in
the same. However, empirically estimated stochastic discount factors are typically
U-shaped in the value of the asset, violating this hypothesis. This contradiction is
referred to as the ‘pricing kernel puzzle’. This section will show how the framework of a
model like that of Section 1.4 can deliver such a theoretical stochastic discount factor that
matches the data.
1.6.1 Theory
Total production in the economy of this paper with and without uncertainty is shown
in Figure 5.12. There are two lines - the first (blue) is total production in the economy
when the public entity cannot perfectly invest in information. The second (red) is total
production when there is no uncertainty (a perfectly informative public signal). As we
can see, there is a sizable difference between the two lines, as poor public signals cause
higher credit spreads and lower levels of borrowing and investment.
In the asset pricing literature, the law of one price implies that for a given asset that
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pays off a certain vector {x1, ..., xn} in a subsequent period, the price of that asset today






We can convert this into probability terms, by multiplying and dividing each side by the









The stochastic discount factor, or pricing kernel, is defined as the ratio of the conditional
price to the true probability. The price of a riskless asset should simply be: 1 + r f = 1E[m] .
In order for the stochastic discount factor to not be degenerate, the conditional prices
must not be exactly equal to the true probabilities, which would only occur under
risk-neutrality.
The stochastic discount factor for an agent whose utility is a concave function of total
production in the economy is shown in Figure 5.13. As is evident, uncertainty causes
slightly U-shaped sdf, while the no-uncertainty case has a monotonically decreasing sdf.
It therefore seems intuitive that conditional uncertainty would be able to explain the
U-shaped pricing kernel found in nonparametric empirical studies.
1.6.2 Empirics
Here I want to test whether I can match the literature by non-parametrically
estimating the pricing kernel smile from the data. Then, upon controlling for conditional
expected uncertainty, I want to test whether the kernel is monotonically decreasing in
the value of the underlying.
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1.6.2.1 Strategy
I can non-parametrically estimate the stochastic discount factor implied by prices and
historical returns of the S&P index and its options. Typically, in the literature, estimates
of the stochastic discount factor are U-shaped and non monotonic. I already have all of
the risk-neutral probabilities from the options data as described above. I can further
construct daily physical probability distributions by using a moving window of
historical returns and fitting the kernel density estimator of the previous section to it8.
Then taking the ratio of the two pdfs will yield a vector of the sdf for each date.
I obtain the U-shaped pricing kernel as in other examples in the literature - a ratio of
the physical and risk-neutral probabilities - and then further propose a novel resolution:
the sdf is U-shaped in anticipation of conditional uncertainty. That is, when rare events
occur, as we have seen, there is a spike in uncertainty. This spike is anticipated by
market participants, leading to a higher value of the pricing kernel for those values.
I can test conditional uncertainty explanation by running the following
cross-sectional regression:
sd fit = α0 + α1changeundi + α2physprobit + α3physvolit + α4SPValt + εit
where sd fit is the non parametrically estimated stochastic discount factor of percentage
return i at time t, changeund is percentage return i at time t, physprob is the physical
probability of the return i at time t, physvol is the expected volatility of return i at time
t9, and SPVal is the actual level of the S&P index at time t. The aim is to test whether
α1 < 0, and α3 > 0.
8. I use windows of 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000, and 1500 days - the results do not change significantly. In the
reported tables I use a window of 1000 days.
9. Again here a rolling window is used to construct this series, with a size equal to the window used
to calculate the physical probabilities of price movements. Instead of a distribution here, I use a spline to
interpolate between the historical values of the VIX at different levels of returns.
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1.6.2.2 Results
A graph of the mean and two-standard deviation bands of the pricing kernel is
plotted below in Figure 5.15a. As expected, the shape of the pricing kernel is
non-monotonic in the value of the underlying, with a slight U-shape. Next is a plot of
the mean physical and risk-neutral distributions of price changes as well as the mean
physical distribution of expected volatility. Now, controlling for the shape of the
physical VIX, we can run the regression specified above to test whether the underlying is
negatively correlated with the sdf. The results can be seen in Figure 5.15 and Table 5.5.
The first regression shows that without controlling for the VIX, there is an insignificant
and slight negative correlation between the sdf and the underlying. However, upon
inclusion of the VIX, the size and significance of the effect increases. Controlling only for
the effect of the VIX, the new mean of the sdf is as in Figure 5.15b which is clearly more
monotonic than before. The results do not show a complete resolution of the puzzle,
empirically, but do move towards a solution.
1.7 CONCLUSION
I have presented, solved, and simulated a model that describes the process of
informational investment by private investors. The solution to the model leads to
contingent information sets that are most accurate near the mean of a distribution and
most inaccurate in the tails. Therefore, upon the realization of a tail event, uncertainty
spikes. The interaction of the information sets lead to concurrent spikes in bid-ask
spreads and dispersion of beliefs, as well as drops in asset demand. However, an initial
increase in uncertainty results in a flatter distribution, which in turn, leads to lower
levels of information investment on average. As a result, initial spikes in uncertainty can
can persist for several periods before resolving.
Further, I present a variety of empirical evidence that is consistent with the model,
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including that low probability events are a significant predictor of increases in the VIX,
that such events have persistent effects on the VIX and lower the probabilities of
subsequent price movements, and that forecasting simulations of the model are able to
mimic the actual path of expected volatility and match patterns in credit spreads,
dispersion of beliefs and debt margin.
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Chapter 2




Can two people come to permanently differ in their beliefs about an objective state of
the world? Can one person be permanently wrong about that state? It would appear that
the simple answer to these questions is no. With Bayesian updating and informative
signals, beliefs should converge to the truth irrespectively of the starting point.
However, in reality, we do observe persistently heterogeneous beliefs in a variety of
fields on issues of common values or objective truth from politics, to sports, to
economics and finance. How can these divergences occur? In this paper, we show how
the simple assumption that agents are attention-constrained implies the possibility of
them coming to the wrong belief permanently. When an individual can choose the level
of attention to pay to different states, he elects to obtain more precision in the state he
judges more likely, generating a confirmation bias. The confirmation bias implies that
when an agent perceives the wrong state of the world in one period, she is more likely to
make a similar perceptual mistake in the next period. In addition, we show that when an
agent’s beliefs are biased enough, she stops paying attention to the problem whatsoever
and beliefs are stuck, which we label the confidence effect. Eventually, an individual led to
wrongly biased beliefs due to mistaken signals, a situation which is made more likely
with confirmation bias, can thus be permanently wrong.
The impact of prior beliefs on the pattern of information collection, and especially in
the direction of updating, has been observed in various settings. Polls by Pew Research
Center show how Republicans’ and Democrats’ positions on government policies
related to civil liberties evolved in opposite directions before and after the election of
Barack Obama. In 2006, 75% of Republicans and 37% of Democrats viewed the “NSA
surveillance programs” as “Acceptable”; In 2013, those numbers were 52% and 64%. In
2002, 53% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats agreed that the “government [should]
be able to monitor emails”; in 2013 those numbers were 45% and 53%.
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A divergence in the evolution of beliefs due to different priors has been evinced more
systematically. Darley and Gross (1983) ask some experimental subjects to judge a
child’s ability based only on some information about their socio-economic background.
They give the same socio-economic information to another set of subjects who are then
shown a video of the child completing an academic test, after which the subjects are also
asked to rate the child’s ability. The viewing of the video increases the reported child’s
ability when the socio-economic information reveals the child to come from a
high-income neighbourhood, the opposite occurs with the other treatment.
In this paper, we suggest that there can be polarization of beliefs on common value
issues through the effect of priors on the collection and the interpretation of information.
A biased agent pays more attention to a state she believes to be more likely to be true.
More formally, with two possible states of the world, she chooses the signal to be more
informative in the state which is more likely under her prior. Interpretation errors will
thus be more numerous in the state that goes against her beliefs. Therefore, initial
interpretation errors which bias the agents’ belief against the true state of the world will
beget new interpretation errors.
Our framework, while intuitively simple, actually enables us to achieve divergence. It
is quite straightforward to achieve permanent divergence, and the divergence often
occurs very quickly. However, the convenience of having such strong divergence results,
is twofold. The first is that it allows us to provide an micro foundation option for
heterogeneous beliefs. The second is that it occupies a space on the opposite end of the
spectrum from Blackwell. Having two results under two different, but related
frameworks, allows for the possibility of hybrid models that could lead to a more
sophisticated understanding of disagreement.
Blackwell and Dubins (1962) showed that increasing information among agents with
absolute continuity in priors, must lead to convergence (or as they termed it, ‘merging’)
of opinions. Any Bayesian agent can observe a imperfect signal and be temporarily
48
distracted, but in the limit, the truth must be reached. This powerful result has formed
the bedrock of a strand of economic literature. In particular, how can we reconcile such a
result with the many protracted disagreements we see around us? Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2006) and Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2008) use
the idea of noise in the inference process of agents to allow for belief divergence. Other
more direct critiques of Blackwell and Dubins have come from such papers as Freedman
(1963) and Miller and Sanchirico (1999), which make a technical argument against the
assumption of absolute continuity in their proof. Our approach is somewhat different -
in that we allow for there to be noise in the process of a signal’s perception, but there is
no incomplete information, nor does our result rely on agent’s placing zero weight on
one state in their prior (as for example, is the case in Berk (1966)).
Our focus on the impact of prior beliefs on information interpretation is motivated by
a long list of empirical findings. First, there has been substantial research uncovering the
confirmation bias, and we refer the reader to the review by Nickerson (1998), who
defines it as “the unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence”.
More particularly, various papers have tried to analyze how agents collect and
interpret information. A first notion which has been studied in political science is that of
selective exposure: agents choose the sources of information and their potential bias.
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), and Baumeister and Newman (1994), provided evidence
for agents suggesting that people pay less attention to information confirming their prior
and evaluate “disconfirming evidence” more thoroughly. In finance, Huberman and
Regev (2001) narrates how a front-page story in the New York Times about a
cancer-curing drug reported months earlier, publicly, by Nature, led to a dramatic jump
in the stock of a company linked to the drug.1. In political economy, Redlawsk (2008)
shows that voters are looking for information about preferred candidates and avoid
information about candidates they dislike. Other references for similar results include
1. See also Lipe (1998)
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Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995), Taber and Lodge (2006).
A second strand has looked at information misinterpretation, or how two agents can
look at the same information differently. In addition to Darley and Gross (1983)
mentioned above, Taber and Lodge (2006) show in the political realm that arguments in
favor of the prior are considered stronger than arguments against. In accounting,
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) demonstrate how the presentation of information affects its
interpretation, a literature to which Hirst and Hopkins (1998) contribute as well. Other
examples can be found in, for instance, Fryer, Harms, and Jackson (2013).
The overwhelming evidence for the existence of a bias in the collection of information
has led to a flourishing theoretical literature to understand its impact on the path of
beliefs, to which our work is closely related. The necessity of a new framework to
understand how beliefs are formed has been made even more salient by a recent paper
by Baliga, Hanany, and Klibanoff (2013) where they show that divergence cannot occur
in a Bayesian updating framework. Various models which discuss the potential impact
of priors on information collection have been proposed. Both Suen (2004) and
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) show how it might be rational to choose an information
source biased towards one’s prior because only such a source can credibly reveal
information against the prior, which would make it worth it to incur the cost of
updating. Rabin and Schrag (1999) model confirmation bias as an exogenous probability
of misinterpretation of incongruent signals. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) assume that the
utility function is a increasing function of the difference between actual consumption
and a reference point so that prior expectations play a role. Fryer, Harms, and Jackson
(2013), in the paper most closely related to our work, assume that agents receive
ambiguous signals which they interpret as signals in favor of their prior, and keep only
this interpretation in memory.
Instead, we adopt the Inattentive Valuation framework laid out in Woodford (2012b)
where the precision of information is an endogenous choice of the individual. Agents
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are motivated by simply being correct, but the accuracy of their perception – the
precision of their signals – is limited by an attention cost. This attention cost is a fixed
marginal cost imposed on the amount of information conveyed by a choice of precision
levels. This information quantity is measured using tools from information theory
developed by C. E. Shannon (1948) for communication systems, and also discussed by
C. a. Sims (2003).
Importantly, agents’ utility function is simply minimizing squared error terms. They
are fully rational and try to maximize utility subject to certain constraints or costs, and
further they are Bayesian, and use Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs given their
perceived signals.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 will explain Woodford (2012b) and show
that the naive approach will be insufficient to resolve the question we’re trying to
answer. Section 2.3 sets up a static problem where there is uncertainty about a binary
variable, and the precision on the observation of the actual value of the variable is
affected by the prior over the two alternatives. Section 2.4 extends the analysis to a
dynamic setting where an agent is allowed to perform multiple (even infinite)
observations about the variable. Section 1.7 concludes.
2.2 SETUP
Suppose that there are two possible states of the world, A and B. An agent has a prior
that the state is A which we denote by π = P(A). We will henceforth write P(E) for the
probability of a given event E. The agent’s decision is to choose the level of attention to
pay to each possible state, i.e. the probability of observing it correctly, in order to
maximize accuracy. The “perceptions” of the states r ∈ {a, b} are assimilable to a typical
“noisy signal”. Formally, the attention that the agent pays to the states can be
characterized by α = P(r = a|x = A) for state A and β = P(r = b|x = B) for state B.
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In standard models of this form with private information, α and β are usually given
exogenously and signals are assumed to be informative, i.e. α, β > 12 . Under these
setups, agents who update their beliefs using Bayes Rule, as ours do, will always come
to learn the truth in the limit. The reasoning behind this is simple: if the true state is A it
must be the case that in the limit, the proportion of “a” signals that the agents sees is
exactly α; if the true state is B, this fraction will be 1− β. α = 1− β would imply that the
signals are uninformative about the state.
In our model, α and β are decision variables: the signals’ precisions are endogenous.
Typically, higher values of α and β will be more desirable for the agent. If information
was not costly, he would choose α = β = 1. If we assume, however, that attention has a
price, this will usually not be the case. Assume that the quantity of information allowed
by a choice (α, β) can be written as a function Γ(α, β; fl) which depends on the attention
choices, and perhaps some additional parameter(s) fl. Intuitively, a standard condition
on Γ would be that it is increasing in both α and β. Given this quantity, we can also
quantify the attention cost as a function of Γ(.). We will turn to information theory to
find a cost function that is well-founded in the literature.
We quantify information by considering a model of the perceptual system as a
communication system, and use the tools developed by C. E. Shannon (1948). The
decision frameworks developed by C. a. Sims (2003) and Woodford (2012b) employ
Shannon’s work in the economic world in quantifying information. We quantify the
information conveyed by a choice of attention in the same way, and assume that there
exists a fixed marginal cost incurred by an agent in increasing this quantity.
The information conveyed by an attentional choice (α, β) is quantified by a measure of
the difference in uncertainty about the state of the world before and after the perceived
signal, where uncertainty is measured by entropy (C. E. Shannon (1948)).
The prior π yields the entropy of the prior belief. The choice of attention along with
the prior yields the entropy of the posterior belief. The expected amount of information
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conveyed by the attention choice is the mutual information between the prior and the
posterior. The larger the gap between the distributions, the more informative the
attention choice. In our model, this quantity is:2
I((α, β); π) = −EP(x,r) [ln(P(x))− ln(P(x|r))]
We then have:
I((α, β); π) = απ ln(α) + (1− α)π ln(1− α)
+ (1− β)(1− π) ln(1− β) + β(1− π) ln(β) (2.1)
− [απ + (1− β)(1− π)] ln(απ + (1− β)(1− π))
− [(1− α)π + β(1− π)] ln((1− α)π + β(1− π))
The agent’s problem is to minimize errors, under an attention cost based on
I((α, β); π). This cost can either be a pure marginal cost, or a shadow cost of relaxing a
fixed constraint on the overall attention level. The maximization of accuracy here is
equivalent to minimizing squared error (a more conventional objective) considering a
situation where the utility of being correct is 1 and 0 otherwise.
The framework of rational inattention proposed by C. a. Sims (2003) uses mutual
information directly. If attention has a fixed marginal cost θ > 0, the cost of attention is




πα + (1− π)β− θ I((α, β); π) (2.2)
There are various way of interpreting θ. One important interpretation is that it
2. We use the natural logarithm here instead of the logarithm in base 2, but this has no influence on the
results.
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represents an opportunity cost in terms of attention paid to other attention problems: θ
would increase in the number or complexity of other decision problems that the agent
faces.
Rational inattention induces a constraint on the expected amount of information
conveyed by an attention choice, meaning that it can be cheap to invest attention on a
low-probability state. In particular, Woodford (2012b) shows that rational inattention
cannot explain the higher attention paid to more likely states in the experiment of Shaw
and Shaw (1977).
Instead, we assume that the choice of attention is costly because of the information
capacity it generates. The capacity of a communication system is the maximum rate of
information that can be transmitted without error (C. E. Shannon (1948)): if a source
signal has an entropy higher than the capacity, the transmission must result in some
errors, if it is lower, it can be transmitted perfectly. The capacity is then a measure of the
amount of information that a choice of attention can transmit, as opposed to what it is
expected to transmit.
Formally, the constraint will not depend on the discrepancy of the posterior to the
actual prior π, but on the maximum possible discrepancy of the posterior to a potential
prior.
Denote π∗(α, β) =argmax
π
I((α, β); π) and I∗(α, β) the mutual information evaluated
at π∗(α, β). I∗(.) is the channel capacity of the perceptual system defined by the
attention choice (α, β). The “inattentive valuation” problem then differs from the
rational inattention model by assuming that the attention cost is based on I∗(.).
Assuming a fixed marginal cost θ > 0, the cost function becomes
Γ(α, β; fl) = θ · I∗((α, β)) so that the problem becomes:
Max
α,β
πα + (1− π)β− θ I∗(α, β) (2.3)
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Note here that γ ≡ ∅. This is crucial - as it is the key differentiator of our Inattentive
Valuation framework from Rational Inattention. The entire cost function can be written
in terms of the choice variables, and does not depend at all on the prior distribution of
the agent.
The use of the capacity measure is attractive for various reasons. First, the capacity of
a communication channel has a strong importance in the information theory literature,
and measures the amount of information a system with a given error rate (in our case,
(1− α, 1− β) is able to transmit accurately. The assumption in the analogy with the
perceptual system is that attention allows the reception of a given quantity of
information, so that it should not depend on π, a measure of the quantity of information
for the current problem directly. More practically, the independence of the capacity on π
implies that the drawback of the mutual information quantity disappear: paying
attention in unlikely states is now expensive because the attention choice would allow
more information to come in.
One final assumption is in order. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on a choice of
attention (α, β) such that α + β ≥ 1. Remember this condition’s importance from our
discussion of exogenously determined errors. This assumption is without loss of
generality given the symmetry of the problem. The assumption simply states that a
perception “x” is indeed perceived as favoring state X, but as is standard in those types
of models, a simple relabelling of the signals could imply the opposite. We will write
∆ = {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2|α + β ≥ 1} and3 ∆̊ = ∆ \ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}
2.3 THE MYOPIC PROBLEM
Let us first consider a myopic agent - who cares only about maximizing his single
period utility, thus solving Problem (2.3).
3. ∆̊ is defined because all the quantities discussed in the paper, including partial derivatives of I∗(.), for
instance, are well defined on the interior of ∆ and can be extended by continuity on ∆̊
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2.3.1 Properties of I∗
In order to properly understand the results of this section, we first analyze the
properties of the attention function I∗(.).
First, for any choice of attention (α, β) we can find the prior which maximizes the
quantity of information provided by this choice, denoted π∗(α, β). Using the first order
condition with respect to π in Equation (2.1), we obtain:4
∀α, β ∈ (0, 1)2, π∗(α, β) = f (α, β)(1− β)− β
(1− α− β)(1 + f (α, β))







Given π∗(.), we can find simple formulas for I∗(.). In particular, if one denotes
q∗(α, β) = π∗(α, β) · α + (1− π∗(α, β)) · (1− β) the average probability of observing
signal a:
I∗(α, β) =(1− β) ln(1− β) + β ln(β)− (1− β) ln(q∗)− β ln(1− q∗)
I∗(α, β) =(1− α) ln(1− α) + α ln(α)− α ln(q∗)− (1− α) ln(1− q∗)
I∗(1, 1) = ln(2); I∗(α, 1− α) = 0
where the arguments of q∗(.) are implicit.
The specific quantities shown above are intuitive. I∗(1, 1) is the information conveyed
by full attention. With the natural logarithm, perfect attention implies that a digit, or
ln(2) bits, can be observed perfectly. On the other hand, I∗(α, 1− α) is the information
conveyed by a choice of attention which is completely uninformative: each signal has
the same probability in each state.
Figure 5.20 displays the isoquants for I∗, with the diagonal corresponding to attention
4. We write down the explicit formulas in the calculations for α, β ∈ (0, 1)2. Although most of the
quantities here and below are not defined on the boundary of ∆, they can be extended by continuity. The
expressions for all α, β are available upon request.
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choices which convey no information (I∗ = 0), and the curves shifting upwards with
higher attention levels. Several properties are already apparent, notably, the concavity of
the isoquants. A point of some note, is that the I∗ isoquants correspond closely with the
experimental signal detection theory data - specifically the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC). The ROC plots the probability of correct identification of a binary
signal against the probability of a false positive, which is precisely the mirror image of
Figure 5.20. The intuition is that there is a tradeoff between increasing correct
identification and increasing false positives. This lends some credence to the notion that
we should constrain the channel capacity as opposed to the mutual information for
binary identifications. The isoquants obtained here that match the shape of the ROC are
unique to our formulation of constraining the channel capacity and cannot be replicated
by constraining the mutual information. Thus, this replication of a neurological
phenomenon should lend some further credence to the selection of our constraint.
Proposition 5 (Convexity of information capacity). I∗ is infinitely differentiable on ∆̊ and is
strictly convex in (α, β)
As an agent wishes to increase precision in one state, she must sacrifice precision in
the other to maintain the same level of informativeness, and increasingly so as the prior
changes. Namely, the marginal rate of substitution of precision on state A for precision
on state B is increasing: as the precision on one state becomes weaker, it becomes more
“valuable” or “informative” at the margin, relatively to the other state. Proposition 5
shows that this pattern is the result of I∗ being a convex function of the information
structure (α, β).
Figure 5.20 also shows that if an agent tries to become certain about one state, the
marginal increase in the information quantity increases to become infinite – so that with
a fixed marginal cost, certainty would be infinitely costly. This means that for any fixed
marginal cost, the agent will never choose fully informative signals. The marginal rate of
substitution described above becomes unboundedly large at extreme priors. Proposition
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6 shows formally that when α is close to 1, the marginal increase in I∗() from a marginal
increase in α is infinite and the marginal increase in I∗() from a marginal increase in β is
bounded away from 0.
In addition, the proposition shows that marginally increasing precision from a state
where attention is completely uninformative bears no cost as long as both precisions can be
increased, i.e. (α, β) ∈ ∆̊ . This has important implications: it implies that there are only
two possibilities: either an agent pays attention to the problem by setting α, β such that
I∗(.) is strictly positive, or one of the state’s precision is set to 1 and the other to 0.
Proposition 6 (Marginal informativeness on the boundaries of ∆̊).






∂β ∈ (0, ∞)
• ∂I
∗(α,β)
∂α = 0⇔ α + β = 1
The properties of I∗(.) have important implications for the pattern of attention
choices which result from solving Problem (2.3). First, the assumption that the cost of
attention is independent of the prior generates a confirmation bias in that more attention
is paid to the most likely state, given its higher marginal return (weighted by the prior)
in terms of accuracy. As a consequence, attention is allocated evenly when the prior is
unbiased (π = .5) and is increasingly unbalanced as π is further from .5. Because I∗(.) is
convex (Proposition 5) and because the marginal cost of attention is fixed, the
confirmation bias implies that the total amount of attention allocated to the problem,
endogenously given by I∗(α, β), decreases with the prior. Finally, because the marginal
cost of certainty on a state is infinite (Proposition 6), there will be a level of bias after
which it is optimal to pay no attention whatsoever to the problem at stake. Those results
are shown formally below.
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2.3.2 Attention choices
We first show in Proposition 7 that the choice of attention is strictly monotonous in
the prior when some attention is actually paid (i.e. I∗(.) > 0) and the solution is interior.
Because the optimal attention choices are continuous functions of the prior and that the
solution is trivially interior at π = .5, the proposition shows that as the prior is more
biased, more attention is invested in the more likely state . We label this effect the
confirmation bias. In the following, we denote α(θ; π) and β(θ; π) the solutions of
Problem (2.3), and C(θ; π) = I∗(α(θ; π), β(θ; π))





∀θ > 0, ∀π|(α(θ; π), β(θ; π)) ∈ ∆, ∂α(θ;π)∂π ≥ 0,
∂β(θ;π)
∂π ≤ 0.
The condition that (α(θ; π), β(θ; π)) ∈ ∆̊, as we will see in the next propositions, is
valid for priors π which are not “extreme”, i.e. far away from 12 .
The confirmation bias has one immediate, important consequence: in a myopic (as
opposed to forward-looking), dynamic model, an agent biased in favor of the wrong
state is more likely to perceive the wrong state afterwards. Perceptual mistakes beget
perceptual mistakes; and beliefs depend not only on the content of the perceptions but
also on their order, as opposed to a standard Bayesian model.
We then show in Proposition 8 that this confirmation bias and the unequal attention to
the two states imply that as an agent becomes more sure of her opinion, she lowers the
overall attention paid to the problem. Eventually, she pays no attention to the problem at
all for extreme priors: in particular, I∗(α, β) converges to 0 when π approaches unity,
and attention level approaches certainty. We label this effect the confidence effect.
Proposition 8 (Confidence effect). C(θ; π) →
π→1
0 and C(θ; π) →
π→0
0. Further, α(θ; π) →
π→1
1
and β(θ; π) →
π→1
0; α(θ; π) →
π→0
0 and β(θ; π) →
π→0
1.
The combinations of the two previous results have important implications. One can
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easily see that when π = .5, the choice of precision in each state is equal, and signals are
informative: ∀θ > 0, α(θ; .5) > 12 , β(θ; .5) >
1
2 . However, because the solutions are
continuous there exist a bias after which perceptions in both states are more likely to
favor the same state. At the limit, perceptions in both states always favor the same state.
We show in Proposition 9, that this shutdown occurs before the agent is certain about
the state, i.e. the optimal level of I∗(α, β) is nil for large priors: the agent chooses an
information structure which conveys no information at all about the state by focusing
their attention fully on the most likely state.
Proposition 9 (Information shutdown at extreme priors). ∀θ, ∃π(θ)|∀π > π(θ),
β(θ; π) < 0.5 and α(θ; π) > 0.5. ∀θ, ∃ ¯̄π(θ)|∀π > ¯̄π(θ), β(θ; π) = 0 and α(θ; π) = 1
The confidence effect reflected in a decrease in the amount of attention I∗(.) for a
given prior can be seen in Figure 5.21a, where we set θ = 1: the amount of information
conveyed by the choice of attention falls increasingly quickly as the prior moves away
from 12 and hits 0 before π = 1. We show the corresponding choices of attention Figure
5.21b: the attention paid to state A increases as the belief increases away from 12 , so that
for a high level of the prior the agent only pays attention to state A.
The fact that an agent can stop thinking about the problem altogether when the prior
is strictly below 1 makes it intuitively possible that at the end of time in a repeated game,
her prior will be wrong in the sense that she will be stuck at a belief putting more weight
on the wrong state. This would imply that a permanent polarization of beliefs is possible.
The next question is whether a forward-looking agent, who takes into account the
consequences of a contemporaneous choice of biased attention on future mistakes, can
diverge in that way.
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2.4 THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM
In the previous section we have been comparing the attention choices of an agent
when he observes a single signal, which can also be interpreted in a dynamic setting as
the choices made by a myopic agent. We have stressed, in particular, the impact of the
prior, given exogenously, on attention choices. This leads to another question: how are
those priors formed? What is the impact of limited attention on the formation of the
prior? In this section, we analyze this question by considering rational agents with the
same initial belief and analyzing how the cost of attention affects their choices on the
attention paid to a stream of signal. Because priors affect contemporaneous attention
choices through the confirmation bias, for instance, a forward-looking agent must take
into account the fact that a perceptual mistake made in one period makes future
mistakes more likely. Because of the confidence effect, the forward-looking agent must
also consider that the change in her beliefs’ bias will affect the total amount of attention
paid to future problems. The main question of interest, eventually, is whether the last
result of the previous section holds in this dynamic case: can an agent’s belief be
permanently stuck against the actual state of the world? More generally, can two agents
with the same initial prior diverge permanently in their beliefs?
2.4.1 Statement of the Dynamic Problem
As before, we will assume that there is a state of the world, either A or B. We assume
that it remains constant over time, and that it sends a stream of unambiguous5 signals to
the agents in question. For example, if the state were A (as we will assume wlog) the
signals would be “a”,“a”,“a”, . . . . The probabilities on the perceptions of those signals
are dictated by their choices of attention at each period, so that they would typically
change over time. The marginal cost of attention, θ, is fixed over time.
5. This assumption is relaxed in the next section.
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Consider a model with an infinite number of periods, in discrete time starting at date
0: each period is denoted t ∈N. At each period, the agent’s instantaneous payoff is the
benefit to accuracy net of the information cost, equivalent to the one-period objective of
Problem (2.3). Future periods are discounted by δ < 1. The decision maker chooses the
attention level for every period to maximize the discounted expected value of those
instantaneous payoffs. Formally, the dynamic problem can be written given an initial








(u(x, rt)− θ I∗(αt, βt)) |π0
]
(2.4)




1 if rt = x
0 if rt 6= x
This particular structure of the new problem requires some explanation. In the static
version of the game, the agent selected accuracies α and β in order to maximize accuracy
subject to a constraint. The implicit assumption of that structure was that the agent
wanted to maximize accuracy because there was a second decision, selecting whether
the state was A or B after observing the signal, and that the payoffs were such that he
would receive 1 for correct identification, and 0 for incorrect identification. The
minimization of the squared error led to the objective function as stated. In the dynamic
case, we cannot have sequential assessment of the agent’s decisions. Under the
assumption of perfectly informative signals (no noise in the data generating process),
any assessment would be fully informative of the state. Our assumption here therefore,
is that after each signal the agent takes an action (selecting A or B), which will be
evaluated after all signals have been viewed. We believe that this is a better way to think
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about protracted disagreements. For example, consider the case of Global Warming - as
the environment sends us signals which we try to attend to and understand, we are
actively taking decisions: to limit carbon emissions, to try to find alternative energy
sources etc. The value of these decisions will not be apparent to us for a long time.
Another example is the determination of the long run riskiness of a particular market.
As research is conducted, we may buy or sell assets as we refine our opinions, but our
actions will not be assessed for some time. Matters in which our actions can be quickly
evaluated, are much less likely to result in protracted or permanent disagreement, as the
evaluation should give concrete evidence to support one opinion over another.
Problem 2.4 can be written in the form of a Bellman equation, where the state variable
in question is the prior πt with which an agent enters period t. This yields:
V(πt) = max
αt,βt
πtαt + (1− πt)βt − θ I∗(αt, βt) (2.5)
+ δ
[
(αtπt + (1− βt)(1− πt))V(πat ) + ((1− αt)πt
+ βt(1− πt))V(πbt )
]
where the priors at the start of period t + 1 after perceiving signal “a” and “b”
respectively, πat and π
b
t are given by the posteriors at the end of period t:
πat =
αtπt
αtπt + (1− βt)(1− πt)
; πbt =
(1− αt)πt
(1− αt)πt + βt(1− πt)
It is simple to show that the Blackwell conditions for the contraction defined by the
Bellman equation are satisfied, so that the value function exists and is the fixed point of
that contraction. We denote αd(θ; π) and βd(θ; π) the attention choices made by the
forward-looking agent with initial prior π. We omit the d subscript when there is no
confusion possible with the static solutions.
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2.4.2 Will Agents Disagree Forever?
Permanent divergence requires that an agent eventually stops paying attention to the
problem. If that is not the case, the share of perceptions “a” and “b” will differ between
states and all individuals will converge to the correct belief (π = 1 if the state is A, for
instance). We show in Proposition 10 that when beliefs become extreme, such an
information shutdown occurs, as we found in Proposition 9 in the myopic problem. For
values of π sufficiently far from 0.5, the agent chooses signal precisions which prevent
him from distinguishing between the two states at all: perceptions are uninformative.
Importantly, the shutdown point is identical to the one found in the myopic case.
Proposition 10. ∀θ > 0, ∃π̃(θ) > 12 |
∣∣∣π − 12 ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣π̃(θ)− 12 ∣∣∣⇒ αd(θ; π) + βd(θ; π) = 1.
Moreover, ∀θ > 0, π̃(θ) = ¯̄π(θ)
Proposition 10 implies that if any agent starts a period with a prior that lies above π̃
or below 1− π̃ where π̃ ∈ (0.5, 1), then he will not pay any attention to signals from that
or any subsequent period. Importantly here, π̃(θ) = ¯̄π(θ), which is to say that the point
of certainty at which the myopic and forward-looking agents choose to stop paying
attention to signals is the same. As we will see later, there is strong evidence to suggest
that the amount of attention paid in the forward-looking case is weakly larger than the
myopic. The reason for this change is that attention in the forward looking case affects
not only signals at present, but the future, and the agent internalizes this future effect.
One could think of this as a multiplier greater than one, that maps myopic attention to
forward looking attention. However, no matter what the multiplier, under the priors for
which no attention is being paid in the static case, no attention is paid either in the
dynamic case.
Extreme beliefs are thus persistent: ∀π′ ∈ [0, 1− π̃) ∪ (π̃, 1],
πt = π′ ⇒ ∀u > t, πu = π′. Even mild disagreement can then persist forever, when θ is
large: clearly, ∂π̃(θ)∂θ < 0 and π̃(θ) →θ→∞
1
2 . The question is then whether individuals with
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the same initial belief π0 ∈ (1− π̃(θ), π̃(θ)) can end up in either of these regions with
positive probability.
In order to answer this, we need to consider the pattern of attention choices in the
forward looking problem. We showed that the shutdown points are identical in the
myopic and the dynamic problems. However, this does not mean that the amount of
attention paid in the static and dynamic cases are the same for all values of the prior.
Consider in particular the problem when π0 = 0.5. We show in Proposition 11 that in
that case, the attention devoted to both states by the forward-looking agent is higher
than in the one-shot problem.
Proposition 11. ∀θ > 0, α(θ; .5) < αd(θ; .5) and β(θ; .5) < βd(θ; .5).
The intuition for this result is simple. Agents in the forward-looking model not only
understand the direct effect that their attention has on accuracy (as is the case in the
static model) but also the indirect effect that their perceptions will have on future
decisions. As such, they will choose to pay more attention based on this forward-looking
effect than they would without it.
We can now show that permanent divergence of agents with the same initial prior can
occur. For this purpose, we show that when the prior is uninformative, the decision
makers consider only the first period signal and stop collecting any information after
that
Proposition 12. If πt = 0.5, then I∗(αt+1, βt+1) = 0. The agent will observe one signal,
update, and shutdown.
This is a strong result, and one that depends, in large part, on the strength of the
signals. That is to say, the signals from each potential state of the world are perfect and
unadulterated. Additionally, at the point π = 0.5, I∗ is at its highest point - the most
attention is being paid. Therefore, perceptions will be very accurate. Very accurate
perceptions of perfectly accurate signals, mean that the perceptions are therefore
additionally, very informative. As a result, large updates in the agents beliefs will take
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place. Large enough, in fact, to make them sure of their opinion. The agent prefers to
front load the attentional cost, in order to forego paying it in any subsequent period.
Consider Figure 5.23. For different values of θ, agents will update to differing degrees
away from 0.5 and then stop acquiring new information. Although we are unable to
provide analytic results for other starting values of π, we can observe some simulations
to get a sense of the dynamics. In Figure 5.22, we see agents starting at values of π 6= 0.5.
It appears that agents who receive confirmatory signals (that is, agents who start with a
prior π > 0.5 and see an “a” signal, or agents who start with a prior π < 0.5 and see a
“b” signal), update once and then shut down. However, agents who receive
contradictory signals (agents who start with a prior π > 0.5 and see a “b” signal, or
agents who start with a prior π < 0.5 and see an “a” signal), will update and then
continue to look for signals.
2.5 EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
We consider here potential extensions and applications of the model to show the
potential uses of the inattentive valuation framework and how the results developed in
the two previous sections could possibly be extended quickly to more general settings
and related questions.
First, we discuss the assumption that all the noise in the perceptions of the states in
our model are endogenous. Second, we adapt the problem to cases where the states are
not weighted identically, i.e. errors in the two states generate different disutility. Third,
we discover what we can say about the intensive and extensive margins of
disagreement. Finally, we summarize the properties of the information quantity which
were sufficient to generate the results described in the previous sections.
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2.5.1 Adding exogenous noise
2.5.1.1 Static
In the framework described in previous sections, we assumed that the noise in the
signals perceived by the agent were purely endogenous, the result of a choice of
attention due to costly information acquisition. However, it seems intuitive that the
information generated by the objective state of the word can actually be distorted even
before their perception by an agent. This distortion will not be a choice, either conscious
or unconscious, of the agent. Formally, assume that in state A, the signal sent is a with
probability 1 > qa > 12 and b with probability 1− qa, and define qb similarly in state B.
The distinction between the exogenous and the endogenous distortion is important.
An agent can only make an endogenous attention choice towards the “signals” derived
from the state of the world and its inherent exogenous noise. Although in the original
framework, the state and the exogenous signal were identical because we assumed no
exogenous noise, we need to make the distinction here. Therefore, let us introduce the
following notations. The state of the world is x ∈ {A, B}. State A sends signal s = a with
probability qa, State B sends signal s = b with probability qb. The agent can only pay
attention to those signals, so that the attention choice has to be rewritten as
P(r = a|s = a) = α and P(r = b|s = b) = β
As we alluded to in the setup of the original problem, the cost of attention is based on
the reduction in uncertainty of an input generated by a given attention choice o this
input. With exogenous noise, the input is the imperfect signal. Given π, qa and qb, this
input has a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p = πqa + (1− π)(1− qb), where p is
the probability of s = a. The reduction in uncertainty about the exogenous signal is thus:
I((α, β); p) = −EP(s,r) [ln(P(s))− ln(P(s|r))]
67
The channel capacity can then be reformulated as I∗exog(α, β) =maxp∈P
I((α, β); p), where
P = [1− qb, qa] is the image within [0, 1] of [0, 1] via the increasing function:
p : π → πqa + (1− π)(1− qb)
Therefore, if π∗(α, β) ∈ P then I∗exog(α, β) = I∗(α, β)
Because π∗(α, β) is bounded away from 0 and 16, we have that the set
Q = {(qa, qb)|∀(α, β) ∈ (0, 1)I∗exog(α, β) = I∗(α, β)} 6= ∅. Although we have not been
able to prove it, we conjecture that the bounds on π∗(α, β) can be computed and that∣∣∣π∗(α, β)− 12 ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣12 − exp(−1)∣∣∣7. In particular, π∗(α, β) is maximal and equal to
1− exp(−1) at α = 1, β→ 0. One can then characterize Q explicitly:
Q = {(qa, qb)|min(qa, qb) > exp(−1)}.
We thus know that provided the exogenous signals are relatively informative
((qa, qb) ∈ Q) the choice of attention in the new framework is the solution to the problem
Max
α,β
π [qaα + (1− qa)(1− β)] + (1− π) [qbβ + (1− qb)(1− α)]− θ I∗(α, β) (2.6)
Writing λ(qa, qb, π) =
qaπ−(1−qb)(1−π)
(2qa−1)π+(2qb−1)(1−π)
the problem is equivalent to:
Max
α,β
αλ(qa, qb, π) + β(1− λ(qa, qb, π))−
θ
2qaπ + 2qb(1− π)− 1
I∗(α, β)
This reformulation means that we can directly find the attention choices as a function
of the prior and the exogenous precisions, as we describe in Proposition 13. Denoting the
solutions αe(θ, qa, qb; π), βe(θ, qa, qb; π), we have:
6. For any attention choices, the mutual information would be 0 in these cases, while it is strictly positive
at π = 12
7. We can show that π∗(1, β) is decreasing in β, but it remains to be shown that the maximum of π∗(1, β)
is indeed achieved at the border.
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Proposition 13 (Attention Choices with Exogenous Noise). • If λ(qa, qb, π) ∈ [0, 1],
αe(θ, qa, qb; π) = α
(
θ
2qaπ + 2qb(1− π)− 1
; λ(qa, qb, π)
)
βe(θ, qa, qb; π) = β
(
θ
2qaπ + 2qb(1− π)− 1
; λ(qa, qb, π))
)
• If λ(qa, qb, π) < 0, αe(θ, qa, qb; π) = 0, βe(θ, qa, qb; π) = 1
• If λ(qa, qb, π) < 0, αe(θ, qa, qb; π) = 1, βe(θ, qa, qb; π) = 0
Given the similarities, most of the qualitative properties of the solutions are
preserved. First, note that given qa, qb > 12 ,
∂λ(qa,qb,π)
∂π > 0. Second, the new marginal cost
θ̃(π) = θ2qaπ+2qb(1−π)−1
depends on π, and θ̃′(π) is of the sign of qb − qa. Finally, θ̃(π) is
bounded. The dependence of the effective marginal cost on π makes the confirmation
bias results less clear-cut. However, given that it is monotonous, it is clear that
qa > qb ⇒
∂αe(θ,qa,qb;π)
∂π > 0, since as π increases, the decrease of the marginal cost
complements the confirmation bias; a similar result is obtained on βe(.) when qb > qa.
Finally, the existence of a shutdown point is still valid since θ̃(.) is bounded below.
In the simple case qa = qb = q, θ̃(π) ≡ ¯̃θ: the effective marginal cost is constant and
we can apply all the results we found for Problem (2.3), including the confirmation bias.








1−π . Those two
conditions are equivalent to 1− q ≤ π and q ≥ π. This is intuitive, as under these
conditions the exogenous noises are larger than the uncertainty in the prior.
If the first condition is not satisfied, i.e. for low π, the weight on α is negative and α is
trivially set to 0. Likewise, if the second condition is not satisfied, i.e. for high π, the
weight on β is negative and β is set to 0.
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2.5.1.2 Dynamic
One of the results of the initial framework with no exogenous noise that is at first
blush perplexing is that at the point of maximal uncertainty (π = 0.5), only one signal is
required to make the agent shut off. It appears that the reason for this result is the
strength of the signals from the state. If θ = 0, an agent would require only one signal to
have perfect information. On the other hand, in the exogenously noisy case, even when
θ = 0, the agent would require infinitely many signals to achieve perfect certainty on the
value of the state. Hence, the updating process is slowed.
As we see in simulations of the case when θ > 0, this carries over to our setup.
Although there are still beliefs for which agents shut down, they approach those beliefs
more slowly, as each signal carries two sources of noise (perceptual and exogenous), and
thus less information.
Consider figure 5.25. The two panels show, in order, the evolution of 50 agents’ priors.
The agents are ex-ante identical, and observe 20 identical signals in these simulations.
The cost of attention in all cases is given by θ = 10. These signals are drawn from state
A, which shows signal “a” with probability q - known to the agents. Here again, agents
eventually shut down, after becoming sufficiently sure of their opinions, but this
certainty takes time. In fact, some agents in the sample did not converge at all after
receiving several conflicting signals.
In conclusion, in the case where qa = qb = 1, we have seen in previous sections that
shutdown occurs (usually) after one signal. Here, we found suggestive evidence that
when 1 > qa = qb > 0.5, shutdown can take many periods. In the other limit case, where
qa = qb = 0.5, all signals are perfectly uninformative, so no amount of attention will be
able to distinguish them. Therefore, agents will set α + β = 1, and will never move from
their original priors.
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2.5.2 Size of divergent cohorts
We showed in section 2.4 that permanent divergence can occur between two
individuals with identical prior, based on their initial perceptions. Can we quantify the
magnitude of this divergence? There are two ways to characterize this disagreement.
The first is to talk about the size of the groups that disagree: is the minority a small
percentage or almost half? The second is to talk about the degree of disagreement: are
the groups relatively close in their beliefs, or is there a large gulf between them? We will
term the former the extensive margin of disagreement, and the latter the intensive
margin.
Consider some 0 < θ < ∞, and π0 = 12 . We know that





. Using the results developed in the proofs of
Proposition 12, we know that for all t > 1 a share ζ of individuals will have a posterior
π1 = πt = ζ and that a share (1− ζ) will have a posterior π1 = πt = 1− ζ. Moreover,
we know that ζ ′(θ) < 0. Therefore, as the cost of attention increases, the intensive
margin of disagreement decreases, but the extensive margin increases.
These results are displayed for different values of θ in Figure 5.24. In the figure, we
show the final distribution of agents when a unit mass starts with a prior of π0 = .5. The
horizontal axis represents the final beliefs, while the height of the bars show the
percentage of the unit mass ending with this belief.
Convergence Under Fixed Capacity It is a relevant question to think about whether or
not the setup of attention in this problem is important to the result. Much of the
literature on attention assumes, instead of a fixed cost of attention, a fixed capacity, or
stock of attention. If we instead consider a problem of the following form:
max
α,β
απ + β(1− π)
s.t.I∗(α, β) ≤ C
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where C is exogenously given, can the same results as above hold? The following
proposition will show that they do not.
Proposition 14. As t→ ∞, πt → 1 for a fixed C. That is, any agent will always converge to the
truth in the limit.
In both Rational Inattention and Inattentive Valuation, the intuition for this result is
relatively straightforward. Under Rational Inattention, there is only one unique fixed
point - and that is π = 1. Therefore, no divergence to any other point is possible. Under
Inattentive Valuation, there are actually two fixed points: π = 1 and π = 0. However,
intuitively, agents under fixed capacity are prevented from paying less attention as their
certainty increases. Therefore, as an agent becomes convinced of the wrong belief, he
must still observe signals with the same net level of accuracy. Therefore, if the agent sees
a string of ‘b′s at first, a subsequent ‘a′ will actually be quite informative as α and β are
necessarily bounded away from 0. Therefore, no matter how close the agent gets to
π = 0, observing an ‘a′ at that point would move him quite far in the opposite direction.
2.5.3 Attention cost function
We showed in the previous sections that our model can be used to solve more general
problems by manipulating the reward for being correct. The final question is to
understand the influence of the choice of the channel capacity as our measure of
attention for the results described in the paper. Indeed, the use of information theory,
mutual information, and channel capacity to quantify information, and the inclusion of a
fixed marginal cost for this quantity, can be seen as specific cases of a general model with
costly attention. Therefore, it is important to understand which conditions on I∗(.) were
necessary to produce the results described in Section 2.3 and 2.4. Here, we described
conditions on the information quantity which are sufficient to generate the confirmation
bias and the confidence effect in the static case.
We consider here classes of functions which do not depend on the prior. We explained
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in the discussion of rational inattention that one drawback in using the actual prior is
that unlikely states are overweighted by definition. In this case, more attention can be
invested towards those states, which would negate a confirmation bias.
Several other restrictions are more intuitive. In particular, we restrict our discussion
to functions which are symmetric in the states – the states are “anonymous”. We also
assume that the information quantity is strictly increasing in its arguments. To prevent
some potential problems linked to the relabelling of the signals, we thus restrict the
arguments’ space to the upper quadrant of the unit square – one can extend the function
to the lower quadrant by symmetry.
Therefore, remember that ∆ = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]|x + y ≥ 1} and denote
F = { f : ∆→ R+| f (x, y) = f (y, x), ∀y ∈ [0, 1]x > x′ ≥ 1− y⇒ f (x, y) > f (x′, y)}
We want to find the properties of a function f ∈ F yielding the results from the
previous section when the agent’s problem is
Max
α,β
πα + (1− π)β− θ f (α, β) (2.7)
Let us denote the solutions to Problem (2.7) as (α f (θ; π), β f (θ; π))
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that the confirmation bias can be extended to all
cases where f is “smooth”, concave and the states’ attention levels are complementary.
We formalize this result in Proposition
Proposition 15 (Confirmation bias). Assume that f is twice differentiable on ∆̊, and strictly
convex. In addition, assume that ∀(α, β) ∈ ∆̊, ∂
2 f
∂αβ > 0. Then










The confidence effect as described in Proposition 4 requires slightly stronger
assumptions. Intuitively, the pattern of collection of information at extreme priors
depend on the value of marginal precisions when those precisions are already extreme.
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The properties of I∗(.) described in Proposition 2, where we listed those values on the
boundary of ∆, were sufficient to generate the confidence effect.
The assumption on f that we require for the effect to be obtained is the combination
of the strict convexity of f and the properties of the marginal informativeness of
attention described in Proposition 2: when precisions can be increased and no
information is currently collected, increasing attention is costless; certainty on one state
is infinitely costly.
The intuition is clear. The second part of Proposition 2 is required since as the prior
increases, the marginal return to precision in the least likely state becomes negligible. If
the f satisfies the condition, the attention choice must converge towards the
anti-diagonal of the unit square, reflecting uninformativeness. At the same time, the
marginal return on the most likely state remains positive, so that the only solution at
extreme priors is the corner solution, where all the precision is oriented towards the
most likely state. The first part of Proposition 2 is required since otherwise, it would be
possible for an agent to have full precision on one of the state while maintaining
information on the other, when the marginal cost θ is small.
Formally, define C f (θ; π) = f ((α f (θ; π), β f (θ; π))).
Proposition 16 (Confidence effect). Assume f satistifies the properties described in
Proposition 15.
In addition, assume that ∀(α, β) ∈ ∆̊, ∂ f (1,β)∂α = ∞ and
∂ f (α,β)
∂α = 0⇔ α + β = 1. Then,
C f (θ; π) →
π→1
0 and C f (θ; π) →
π→0
0. In addition, α f (θ; π) →
π→1
1 and β f (θ; π) →
π→1
0;
α f (θ; π) →
π→0
0 and β f (θ; π) →
π→0
1.
Finally, it is also worth emphasizing that as C. E. Shannon (1948) has shown, the use
of the entropy measure to quantify the amount of information in a random variable
relies on really weak and intuitive assumptions. In particular, it is the only function
satisfying three properties: it is continuous in the distribution of interest, it increases
with the size of the support when the distribution is uniform, and is independent of the
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decomposition of choices.
Therefore, we consider the use of the tools of information theory to be useful and
relevant to understand the role of limited attention on individual decisions. However, it
is clear that one main future area of research will be to know more about the attention
cost function, as Caplin and Dean (2014) do for instance. We hope that by providing
simple properties which would generate confirmation bias and permanent
disagreement, we can provide intuitions on the properties we would expect from such a
function.
2.6 CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper that polarization of beliefs on common value issues can
occur under the simple assumption that people are motivated by belief accuracy but are
constrained in the attention they can pay to the issue. Costly information, as measured
by the amount of information that a choice of attention can potentially convey, leads
agents to select to obtain more precise signals about the states of the world they consider
likely, generating a confirmation bias. When this information has a fixed marginal cost, a
highly biased agent will decide to pay no attention whatsoever to figuring out the state
of the world, so that his beliefs are permanently stuck. As a consequence, an agent who
makes perceptual mistakes at the start of the information collection process can be
permanently wrong, his beliefs being biased against the actual state of the world.
The assumption that attention is limited should be relatively uncontroversial. The fact
that this simple limitation can cause rational individuals to eventually disagree
completely on an objective issue, where they both aim to understand correctly, is
humbling. Indeed, our results show that our disagreements can simply be the
consequence of random, initial mistakes in the perception of signals. Long-term
disagreements can also come from initial, random shocks to prior beliefs. Kaplan and
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Mukand (2011) show that the increase in Republican registration after September 11th,
2001, persists after several years. Mullainathan and Washington (2009) find that two
years after a presidential election, the degree of polarization differs between cohorts
around the age of voting eligibility two years before, with much more polarization in the
eligible one. Outside the world of politics, it is easy to see how these results could affect,
for instance, the interpretation of information in financial markets: Hong and Stein
(2007) provides a review of recent financial literature, and conclude that behavioral
techniques, including that of heterogeneous priors, are required in asset pricing.
More work should be done in order to understand the consequences of limited
attention on information patterns and economic choices. To answer those issues, the
most important avenue of investigation is the analysis of the properties of the attention
cost function. Here, we considered the model proposed by Woodford (2012b), and we
discussed in the final section which properties of the cost function seemed necessary for
our findings. We consider the use of entropy and its derivatives as a measure of
information to be the most promising, for its reliance on a small and intuitive set of
assumptions. However, more can be learnt empirically about the properties of the
function theorists should use. In particular, Caplin and Dean (2014) provides interesting
experimental findings such as the increase in total attention as stakes increase and that
more attention is devoted to discriminate states with higher stakes. Higher stakes, in our
framework, are isomorphic to a lower relative cost of attention, and so this arises
endogenously. More experimental work is needed to uncover additional comparative
statics, or test the properties of existing proposals – in our case, it would be important to
test the concavity of I∗(.) and its behavior at high levels of certainty. We are currently in
the process of continued experimental work to test some of the implications of this paper.
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Chapter 3




Since the onset of the Latin American crisis of the late 1990s, there has been a renewed
support for the use of capital controls in periods of capital bonanza. Even the IMF,
formerly known to support capital account liberalization, has recently emphasized that
controls on capital inflows should be considered as part of the Emerging Economies
policy toolkit (Ostry et al. (2011)). However, most of the papers that conclude that the
imposition of taxes in capital inflows might be optimal find small welfare gains and do
not explicitly consider capital accumulation decisions (see for example Bianchi (2009)).
The primary goal of our paper is to empirically evaluate the effects of capital controls
on fixed investment using both macro and micro data. We evaluate the effects of several
capital controls measures implemented by the Brazilian Government since 2009. We
focus on Brazil because it is the most prominent case of countercyclical capital controls.1
Moreover, financial markets in Brazil are liquid, well developed, and open to foreign
capital flows, leading to a clearer connection between the controls and the real economy.
To formally study the effects of these measures, we first follow the methodology of
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). We use a combination of other countries with similar
characteristics to Brazil to construct a synthetic control country. The control country is
calibrated to match Brazilian macroeconomic data before the imposition of controls. With
that in hand, we can then construct a counterfactual that will be compared to the actual
data to evaluate the impact of the measures on real activity.2 We find that capital controls
had negative effects on both investment and consumption in Brazil, with the former
1. Fernández, Rebucci, and Uribe (2015) examine the behavior of capital controls in a large number of
countries over the period 1995-2011 and find they are remarkably acyclical and that the Brazilian case is an
unusual one, as on average countries did not did not appeal to capital control measures to counteract the
capital inflows on the pre-great-contraction period.
2. Jinjarak, Noy, and Zheng (2013) use the same methodology to evaluate the effects of Brazilian Capital
Controls throughout 2008-11 but they focus solely on the impact on equity flows and on the exchange rate
in the short-run. Duarte, Mello, Carrasco, et al. (2014) also use this methodology applied to Brazilian data
but they focus on the period between 2003-12 to evaluate the performance of the Brazilian economy among
different dimensions.
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being 20% higher, and the latter being 13% higher in the synthetic country. We found no
significant real effects on exports and imports.
To confirm these results at a microlevel and identify the types of firms more affected
by the controls, we then use the Worldscope database on almost 300 Brazilian firms. We
take a reduced form approach to see what the effects of capital controls on investment
were at the firm level. We supplement the data available on Worldscope with data from
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to check the degree to which different firms
took advantage of subsidized loans from the BNDES to counteract this credit supply
shock. We also use export data to evaluate whether firms that export more benefited
from the imposition of capital controls in any particular way. What we find, robust to a
host of different specifications, is that investment over assets unambiguously declined
by as much as 40% after the imposition of capital controls. Further we find that firms
that had access to cheaper credit from the BNDES were able to offset that decline almost
completely.
We are additionally able to use the results from the first section as a novel control. We
would like to run the regressions on the micro data while controlling for macroeconomic
shocks or circumstances that would have impacted Brazil apart from capital controls. In
fact, we can do exactly that by using the synthetic levels of investment as calculated by
the synthetic control method. This captures any patterns in investment that would have
affected all commodity producing/exporting nations that did not impose any controls
during this period.
Separating the sample into classes, we find that the results are not sensitive to the size
of the firm: in percentage terms, it appears that firms were relatively equally affected. If
we then split the sample into groups based on how much firms export, we find that
firms that export more were relatively unaffected by the capital controls - their
investment did not decline significantly, nor did they BNDES loans help them
significantly. However, firms that did not export very much were significantly affected
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by both. This points to the capital controls having a very targeted goal: to support
exporters, potentially at the expense of other firms. Brazil, at the time, was concerned
with a rapidly appreciating exchange rate, which would have hurt exports - by imposing
controls, Brazil avoided this problem, but the resultant investment drop was big enough
to lead to an overall contraction. Moreover, helping exporters did not lead to higher
export volumes as we can see from the results in the macro section.
The combination of these analyses, with aggregate macro and disaggregated micro
data, lead us to conclude that the capital control policies enacted by Brazil did not have
uniformly positive effects. There may have been some benefits in stabilizing the
exchange rate and price level, which has been measured in other works. However, our
work is, as far as we know, one of the few to examine the effects of such controls on real
variables such as consumption and investment, and we find that the effects are strongly
negative, and asymmetric. This should call for a reexamination of such policies, where
modelling accounts not only for the price effects but also the investment effects to gauge
the overall welfare impact of such policies.
Related Literature. This paper is related to a recent theoretical literature that
advocates that controls on capital flows and, more broadly, macroprudential measures
might be desirable in some contexts (Ostry et al. (2011), Bianchi (2009), Korinek (2011),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013), Farhi and Werning (2012), Costinot, Lorenzoni, and
Werning (2011) and many others) to curb what are called ’excessive’ capital flows. This
literature is based on the notion that there are externalities associated with external
borrowing because individual market participants do not internalize their contribution
to aggregate financial instability and ’overborrowing’ in a foreign currency might arise.
Thus prudential capital controls - tightening of restrictions on net capital inflows during
booms and their relaxation during recessions - might be desirable to induce private
agents to internalize this externality, and improve total welfare. This is not a new idea, as
it goes back to Tobin’s (1978) seminal paper. However, most of this literature abstracts
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from the effects on investment and its impact on welfare. Our paper tries to fill this gap
by giving an estimate of the potential effects on investment that might help to complete
an evaluation of its welfare effects.
It is also related to papers that analyze the effectiveness of capital controls. Magud,
Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) provides a thorough survey of this literature and finds that
capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent, alter the
composition of capital flows, and reduce real exchange rate pressures. Klein (2012)
differentiates among episodic and long-standing capital controls and finds that only the
latter have some effect on growth of certain financial variables and with GDP growth.
However, he also points out that these differences seem to arise from the fact that
countries with long-standing controls on capital inflows are also poorer than the other
countries in the sample. Andreasen, Schindler, Valenzuela, et al. (2015) study the effects
of capital controls on corporate bond spreads and find that restrictions on capital inflows
produce a substantial and economically meaningful increase on them, which supports
our results regarding real investment. Finally, Forbes (2007) finds that the Chilean capital
controls during the 90’s increased financial constraints, especially for smaller traded
firms. Our paper contributes to this strand of the literature by focusing on real variables
and finds that there were significant real effects of controls, which is at odds with most
of the previous literature.
Finally, there are some other papers that also study the particular case of Brazil after
the Global Financial Crisis. Chamon and Garcia (2016) document that the capital controls
measures in Brazil had some success in segmenting Brazilian and global financial
markets, but they do not find significant effects in the exchange rate. Jinjarak, Noy, and
Zheng (2013) also employ a synthetic control methodology but they focus mainly on the
effects on capital inflows and were not able to find any significant effect. Finally, Alfaro
et al. (2014) examine the effects of these measures on firm-level stock returns and real
investment and find a significant drop in cumulative abnormal returns for Brazilian
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firms following capital control announcements, with large firms and largest exporting
firms appearing to be less affected. They do not find any statistically significant change
in investment for the whole sample but, when they split the sample, they find that there
was a significant fall in investment for small and non-exporting firms while exporting
firms saw a statistically significant rise in their investment rates. Although they also
focus on firm-level investment, they employ an event-study methodology which do not
control for changes in investment opportunities or the huge increase in provision of
subsidized credit. Our contribution is to show that, even controlling for all these facts
there still was a significant decline in firm investment after the imposition of controls.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a quick view
of capital controls measures in Brazil to contextualize this work. Section 3 describes the
macroeconomic approach and its results. Section 4 describes the microeconomic
approach and its results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 A LOOK AT THE BRAZILIAN CASE
Brazil has a long history of capital controls measures. In the 1990s, a wave of current
account liberalization started. Goldfajn and Minella (2005) state that
The liberalization was a gradual process of establishing new rules on capital
inflows and outflows. The result of the liberalization process was (a)
reduction or elimination of taxes on foreign capital financial transactions and
of minimum maturity requirements on loans; (b) elimination of quantitative
restrictions on investments by nonresidents in financial and capital markets
securities issued either domestically or abroad; (c) permission for residents to
issue securities abroad, including debt, without prior approval by the Central
Bank; (d) more freedom for residents to invest in FDI and portfolio abroad;
and finally (e) the introduction of currency convertibility, initially through the
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mechanism of International transfers in Reais, whereby residents could
transfer their resources abroad through the use of nonresident accounts.
This period of a more open capital account came to an end in 2008 due to massive
foreign inflows. After some short-lived controls in the beginning of 2008, the Brazilian
Government imposed a long list of measures beginning in October 2009 due to the
unprecedented measures of unconventional monetary policy taken by advanced
economies policy makers after the Global Financial Crisis, which were labeled later by
Brazilian President Rousseff as a "monetary tsunami that have led to a currency war and
have introduced new and perverse forms of protectionism in the world". These
measures are the focus of this paper and are described in detail in Table 5.7.3
As noted by Chamon and Garcia (2016), these measures were successful in
segmenting the Brazilian and global financial markets. Figure 5.26 shows the spread
between onshore and offshore dollar rates. The spreads had been relatively small,
around 1%, but had a huge increase after the October 2010 measures, coming back to
previous levels only after the loosening measures of early 2012. Moreover, as we can see
in figure 5.27, after the October 2010 measures portfolio inflows also declined sharply
while foreign direct investments actually increased and other investments were not
affected.4
There seems also to exist a close relation between the capital controls measures and a
strong slowdown in GDP growth and investment (see figures 5.28 and 5.29). The
slowdown occurred both in capital goods production and, to a lesser extent, in capital
goods imports, which might indicate that the effect of controls were more pronounced in
the financing of capital goods purchases and not only on the financing of imports
themselves (see figure 5.30).
3. We did not start our analysis in 2008 because the measures at that time were in place for a very brief
period due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Moreover, it would be hard to disentangle the effects of
the controls from those of the Global Financial Crisis.
4. The increase in foreign direct investments might be related to some relabeling of flows to circumvent
the controls but the Brazilian Central Bank denies that.
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Given all this preliminary evidence, we proceed in the next sections to evaluate more




Looking at figures 5.28- 5.30, it seems evident that Brazil’s imposition of capital
controls stunted growth just as it was rebounding from the 2008 crisis. In this section, we
formally analyze the connection between these measures and the real economy. To
facilitate this, we try to answer the question - what would have happened to Brazil’s real
macroeconomic aggregates had capital controls not been introduced? Brazil is a unique
economy, but not so much so that we cannot learn from other countries which are subject
to similar shocks.
We approach the issue by comparing the economic events in Brazil to a weighted
average of countries that are comparable to Brazil. The general methodology is taken
from Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). By weighting other countries to match the
macroeconomic characteristics of Brazil, we will achieve what we term a synthetic Brazil
that did not impose capital controls. The difference in investment paths upon Brazil’s
institution of capital controls will be the real effect of capital controls.
More formally, let N be the number of countries in our sample and W = (w1, ..., wN)′
be a vector of nonnegative weights such that ∑ wj = 1, where wj represents the weight of
country j in the synthetic country. Our objective is to construct a counterfactual for the
desired variable, which would be given by Y∗1 = Y0W
∗. To do that, we will consider M
many macroeconomic factors, to which we will try to match our weighted synthetic
Brazil. These factors are pre-treatment5 average data such as the real interest rate, GDP,
5. Pre-treatment means before the imposition of capital controls in our case.
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foreign direct investment, and others. Let us call X0 the N ×M matrix that houses all of
the macroeconomic data for all of the countries in our sample before the imposition of
controls i.e., the vectors of pretreatment characteristics for untreated countries. Further
let us call X1 the 1×M vector of the macroeconomic variables for Brazil i.e., the vector
of pretreatment characteristics for the treated country. Finally let V be a diagonal matrix
with non-negative components whose elements reflect the relative importance of each
characteristic. Then W = {w1, ..., wN} is selected to minimize the following expression:
W∗(V) = arg min
wεW
√
(X1 − X0W)′V(X1 − X0W)
The choice of V could be subjective but we try to do it optimally following Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003). Let Y1 be the vector of time-series for the objective variable in
Brazil before the imposition of controls i.e., the vector of pretreatment time-series for the
treated country, and Y0 be the vector of the same time series for the other countries in the
same period. To choose V optimally, we minimize the MSE for the pre-treatment period
6:




3.3.2 Country Selection and Sample Period
For our sample, we must choose countries that have similar characteristics to the
Brazilian economy. Thus, the sample must include both Latin American countries and
other commodities producers, which arguably might be subject to the same shocks that
Brazil suffered after the Global Financial Crises. We also include the USA as the crises
was originated there but, as we will see later, its inclusion is not relevant as it gets zero
weights for all variables hereby analyzed. This leaves us with a sample of 10 countries:
6. Alternatively, we could choose other weighting matrices such as one that gives the same weight for
all countries.
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Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
USA.
For the sample period, to minimize the possible effects of confounding factors and to
have the same amount of data before and after the controls, we restrict our attention to
the 15 quarter before and after the controls: 2006:1 to 2013:2.
3.3.3 The Effects on Real Investment
We begin our analysis by evaluating the effects of capital controls on real fixed
investment. First, we must decide which characteristics to include as our target
pre-treatment moments. We choose the following characteristics: GDP per capita, real
GDP growth, investment to GDP ratio, the share of capital goods imports in total
imports, current account to GDP ratio and FDI to GDP ratio. The first two characteristics
are important to get a synthetic counterpart with the same level of economic
development, as it is well documented that poorer countries tend to invest more than
richer ones. The investment to GDP ratio controls for the level of investment before the
treatment. The share of capital goods imports controls for the reliance of the country in
foreign capital goods. It is a well known fact that developing countries rely more on
imported capital goods than developed economies and thus it is important to take this
characteristic into consideration. The current account to GDP ratio and the FDI to GDP
ratio measure the reliance on external savings to fund investments and consequently are
also important characteristics to be considered. Finally, we also consider the change in
the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that the behavior of these
economies are closely related to it.7
7. We construct real commodity export prices for each country following a methodology similar to
Deaton, Miller, et al. (1995). The methodology is composed by 5 steps: (i) we find the equivalence between
SITC level 4 groups and the IMF commodities database (composed by 51 commodities); (ii) we calculate
for each country the value of each primary commodity exports using the UN COMTRADE database, which
provides annual trade data for SITC level 4 groups, and take the average; (iii) we calculate the weights for
each commodity by dividing its average value of exports for each commodity by the average total value
of primary commodity exports; (iv) we use the weights to compute a geometric weighted-average of (US-
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The countries with nonzero weights are Uruguay (58.6%), Argentina (30.6%), Peru
(5.7%) and Ecuador (5.2%). The results are shown in table 5.8 and figure 5.31. As we can
see, the synthetic Brazil is able to match the pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and
the investment time series. Moreover, the level of investment in synthetic Brazil is
significantly higher at the end of the period, with a gap of around 18%.
To check the significance of our results, we run what is called a placebo test, applying
the methodology described before to all the untreated countries. As we can see in
figure 5.32, the effect in Brazil is significantly different than what we get for other
countries, specially after the October 2010 measures, which is coherent with the evidence
in foreign cost of capital shown in section 2.
Finally, we also verify the robustness of our results by excluding from the original
sample the two countries with the biggest weights, separately. As we can see in
figure 5.33, the results are note very sensitive to the exclusion of these countries.
3.3.4 The Effects on Real Consumption
We now repeat the exercise to consumption, choosing as characteristics GDP per
capita, real GDP growth, consumption to GDP ratio, inflation, share of consumption
goods imports to total imports and investment to GDP ratio. Again, the first two
characteristics are important to get a synthetic counterpart with the same level of
economic development as poorer countries usually have a different profile of
consumption than richer countries. The former are more tilted towards goods while the
latter toward services. Inflation is known to be an important determinant of
consumption expenditures in the short run. The consumption to GDP ratio controls for
the level of consumption before the treatment. We also include investment to GDP ratio
to have an economy with similar spending profile. The share of consumption goods
dollar based) monthly nominal commodity export prices; and (v) we calculate the real commodity price
index by dividing the nominal price index by the U.S. import price of manufactured articles from industri-
alized countries.
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imports controls for the reliance of the country in foreign consumption goods. Finally,
we target the change in the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that
the behavior of these economies are closely related to it.
The countries with nonzero weights are now Peru (70.4%), Uruguay (19.9%) and
Argentina (9.7%).The results can be seen in table 5.9 and figure 5.34. As we can see, the
synthetic Brazil is able to match most of the pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and
the consumption time series. Again, the level of consumption in synthetic Brazil is
higher at the end of the period, but now the gap is somewhat smaller, around 12%.
We run again the placebo test, applying the methodology described before to all the
untreated countries. As we can see in figure 5.35, again the effect in Brazil is different
than what we get for other countries, specially after 2011. However, we now have one of
the placebos closer to the Brazilian gap, which might indicate less significant results.
We exclude again from the original samples the two countries with the biggest
weights, separately, to verify the robustness of our results. As we can see in figure 5.36,
the results are somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of Peru, but the level of synthetic
consumption is even higher than before, which would indicate a stronger effect of
controls on consumption.
3.3.5 The Effects on Real External Variables
Finally, we evaluate what the effects of capital controls were in the external real sector,
repeating the exercise for exports and imports. We choose as characteristics GDP per
capita, real GDP growth, investment to GDP ratio, consumption to GDP ratio and shares
of consumption and intermediate goods exports or imports for each case. The first two
characteristics controls for the level of economic development for the same reasons we
had for investment and consumption. The investment and consumption to GDP ratios
are used to have an economy with similar spending profiles. The shares are important to
get a synthetic country with the same exports and imports profile. Finally, we also
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control for the change in the commodity price export index as there is some evidence that
the behavior of these economies and specially its external sector is closely related to it.
The countries with nonzero weights for exports are Mexico (45.1%), Argentina
(32.1%) and Chile (22.9%) and for imports are Chile (50.6%), Peru (22.6%), Mexico
(15.6%) and Uruguay (11.3%). The results are shown in tables 5.10 and 5.11 and
figure 5.37. As we can see, the synthetic Brazil is able again to match well most of the
pre-treatment characteristics of Brazil and the exports and imports time series. However,
the results now are much weaker. In fact, as we can see in figure 5.38, running the
placebo test lead us to conclude that the effect in Brazil for the external sector is not
much different than what we get for other countries, which indicates that there weren’t
significant effects from the capital controls.
We also verify the robustness of our results again by excluding from the original
samples the countries with the biggest weights, separately. As we can see in figure 5.39
and 5.40, the results are somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of Argentina for exports but
they are still within the range where we would conclude that there was no significant
effect of the controls on them.
This section shows that capital controls had negative effects on both investment and
consumption in Brazil, with stronger and more significant effects in the former, and no
significant effects on external real variables. These results might be important to
evaluate the welfare impacts of capital controls, which gained renewed support since the
Global Financial Crisis. We will now use microeconomic data to check whether we get
similar conclusions using firm level data and identify the types of firms that were more




There are many potential models that we could derive here to generate estimating
equations, but that is not the objective of this work. Our objective is to provide a
quantification of the impact of capital controls, rather than a micro foundation. Our
main estimating equation is:
Invit = β1 Invit−1 + β2After + β3After*BNDESit + β4Control Variablesit + ηi + λt + εit
Invt is investment over total assets at time t. After is an indicator variable that is one
since 2010 and 0 before. After*BNDES is one for every year after 2009 that an individual
firm received a BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) loan, and is zero everywhere else.8
We have different control variables for firms future investment opportunities (proxies for
the marginal product of capital) - the two we will show here are cash-flow over total
assets, and Tobin’s q. Our specification is similar to Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010).
All variables will be fully described, with summary statistics, in the Data section below.
We are positing a story that capital controls had the real effect of constricting
investment. We would initially expect β1 > 0, given the strong documented importance
of lagged investment on current investment spending (see for example Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) and Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2012)). Additionally, given our
story we would expect β2 < 0, that is, that investment after the imposition of controls
would be significantly lower than before. However, if the reason for the drop in
investment were a negative credit supply shock, as we assume, then we would also
expect β3 > 0 as firms who had access to subsidized credit lines were not hit as hard by
8. Loans from the BNDES expanded dramatically after the Global Financial Crisis, going from an average
of R$46 billions before it to as high as R$190 billions in 2013. This strong policy action might have mitigated
the effects of capital control measures on investment and thus we find that it is crucial to control for that.
90
the controls as firms who did not.
Clearly the main estimating equation cannot be executed using simple OLS, as there
are many issues that would potentially distort the results to address9. We will use the
Arellano-Bond method which will deal with these issues.
3.4.2 Data
We obtained our Micro Data from the Worldscope Database on Datastream. We
include all non-financial and non-public utility firms located in Brazil that reported data
between 1994 and 2014. We augment this data with information of firm-level yearly
loans from the BNDES10 as well as firm-level export data from the MDIC (Ministry of
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade).11
Worldscope only reports publicly available data, and so the sample has the potential
to be biased towards larger firms. We start the sample with 651 firms from 1994 to 2014.
Our first step is to drop all financial firms and public utility firms. This was done first by
dropping firms with the relevant SIC codes but then double checked manually. Then, to
minimize the possible effects of confounding factors, we restrict our attention to the four
years before and after the controls: 2006 to 2013. After that, we dropped all firms that
did not report data in both 2009 and 2010 to make sure that all firms in sample reported
the effects of the controls. We also manually went through the remaining firms to
remove any firms who had merged, or been acquired, as this produced unrepresentative
spikes in data. We ended with 265 firms.
Table 5.12 shows some summary statistics for the firms in our sample, over the total
9. There is a potential for endogenous regressors, there may be fixed effects that are correlated with the
explanatory variables, and there could be autocorrelation due to the lagged variable.
10. BNDES provides data for all non automatic operations, which include all loans bigger than R$10
millions and account for more than half of total BNDES disbursements. As we are focusing on publicly
trade companies, the smaller size loans should not be relevant for our analysis.
11. The MDIC only provides data that tells us whether a firm falls in one of the following 6 categories: (i)
No exports; (ii) exports up to US$ 1 million; (iii) exports between US$ 1 and US$ 10 million; (iv) exports
between US$ 10 and US$ 50 million; (v) exports between US$ 50 and US$ 100 million; and (vi) exports
more than US$ 100 million. Thus, we can only split our sample in "big exporters" and "small exporters and
non-exporting firms" without being able to control for firm size.
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period, as well as the four years before and after capital controls. As is evident the level
of investment dropped noticeably, as did sales, while the intensive and extensive margin
of BNDES loans jumped up significantly.
A description of the relevant variables taken from Worldscope (along with the
descriptions from the Worldscope Datatype Definitions Guide) is listed in Table 5.13. We
define investment as capital expenditure, and normalize all variables by total assets.
3.4.3 Baseline Results
The results of our baseline regressions are shown on Table 5.14. The first column is
the main regression. The second column includes business confidence at a yearly
frequency, which should help act as a similar control - the coefficient here is positive,
showing that an increase in business confidence led to higher levels of investment. The
third is a novel control that we adapt from the Macrodata exercise. SynthInv is the first
difference of synthetic Brazil’s Investment (Investment appeared to have a trend, hence
the first differencing). This variable should control for any shocks that would have
affected countries similar to Brazil, and is unique to our approach to this problem. Again
here, this control’s coefficient is positive and significant, showing that a positive shock to
investment in commodity producers (or countries similar to Brazil) increases investment
within Brazil. Controlling for that we still see coefficients with the signs we would
expect on After and After*BNDES. The coefficient on After is consistently negative and
significant at the 1% percent level. The average size of the coefficient is right around 2
percentage points. Given that the average level of investment over assets is around 6.5%,
this represents a significant decline in investment - about 30%. Additionally the
coefficient on After*BNDES is consistently positive and significant at the 1-5% level. The
size of the coefficient is around 1.2. This means that firms that had access to subsidized
credit were able to invest more than those that did not have access, even conditioning on
the general negative trend in investment. Thus, we can infer that firms with BNDES
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access were cushioned against the constraints. Since the net effect of the two coefficients
is still negative, it is reasonable to conclude that even those firms with the cushion may
have had their investment levels drop as well. The coefficient on cash flow is also
significantly positive, though perhaps not large in magnitude. Using other control
variables, such as Tobin’s Q or sales over total assets does not change the results
significantly.
3.4.4 Results by Size
To break down the sample by size, we take the average value of total assets over the
period selected (2006 to 2013), and divide it into groups above the median and below the
median. Summary statistics are shown on table 5.15. We then run the same regressions
as above on the three different types of controls. The results can be seen on Table 5.16.
Interestingly, we see that the effect after capital controls was almost twice a strong for
large as for small firms. Additionally, the effect of the BNDES loans appear to have the
same rough magnitude for both groups, but is far more significant for larger firms.12
One potential explanation for this is that the dry up of foreign capital would have
disproportionately affected larger firms, who had more access to international capital
markets. Another is that small firms generally invest a smaller amount, in terms of a
fraction of their total assets. Although we cannot speak to the first hypothesis, we can
provide supporting evidence for the second. In general, large firms invested almost
twice as much as a fraction of their total assets. Therefore the difference in the size of the
coefficients makes more qualitative sense. In general, it appears that the fall in
investment over assets from before capital controls to after was in the vicinity of 30-40%
for both groups - in line with the aggregate numbers. This indicates, that unlike other
control episodes (notably, that documented in Forbes (2007)), there was not a
12. This result might be related to the fact that BNDES disbursements were tilted towards larger firms
after the Global Financial Crisis (see De Mello and Garcia (2012), Lazzarini et al. (2002) and Bonomo, Brito,
Martins, et al. (2014) for further evidence).
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significantly different effect across differently sized firms.
3.4.5 Results by Exporter
We will now break down the results by the exporting status of individual firms. The
export data was classified by overall size of exports, broken down into ranges. These
were bucketed into 6 groups (from 0 to 5) manually, and then split into two groups to be
as equally numbered as possible. Therefore, even though the column headings say
‘Small Exporters’ and ‘Large Exporters’ - these may not be strictly speaking, accurate.
Really the distinction is between firms that export a lot, and firms that export less.
Whether or not they are net exporters or that they export a considerable share of their
production is not available to us. Summary statistics are shown on Table 5.17. Exporters
that export a lot are, understandably, much larger than exporters that export less.
However, interestingly, although they are larger, they appear to invest slightly less than
smaller exporters. This is a different pattern that what emerged in the size breakdown.
We run again the baseline regressions for both groups. The results can be seen on
Table 5.18. Firms that exported more were far less impacted by the capital controls -
although investment declined, it declined by almost a full percentage point less than
their importing counterparts. These results back the intuition that the capital controls
were implemented for financial (exchange rate) reasons that would limit the harm to
exporters caused by a rapidly appreciating exchange rate.
Thus we have shown, both in aggregate and broken down by size and export status,
that investment over total assets dropped after the imposition of capital controls. Pretty
consistently, the magnitude of the drop was about 30 to 40% of its original value. Large




In this work, we have shown that investment in Brazil unambiguously declined after
the imposition of capital controls in late 2009. Unconditionally, we showed with micro
data investment over total assets dropped at the firm level between 30 and 40 percent.
Firms of different sizes were not generally differentially affected, but larger exporters
fared better than smaller exporters. Additionally, firms that had access to subsidized
credit from Brazil’s Development Bank (BNDES) also performed much better than those
that did not. Conditionally, we showed with macro data that Brazil’s total investment
was roughly 20 percent lower in 2013 than it would have been had controls not been put in
place. Moreover, although larger exporters seem to have suffered less from the controls,
we do not find any significant effect on real exports after their imposition.
The support for macroprudential policies in general and particularly for prudential
capital controls has increased substantially after the Global Financial Crisis. In theory,
capital controls can be desirable and welfare improving if they help to avoid financial
and macroeconomic instability. However, if they have a disproportionate effect on
investment as our results indicate, they might also have strong and long-lasting effects
on potential growth, especially in economies with low savings rate such as Brazil. These
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It will actually be easier to start with the intuition for this proposition and then move
to Proposition 1. It is quick to see that since the benefit of acquiring a signal in
equation 1.6 is increasing in T∗(s), that agents’ informational choices are strategic
substitutes. Therefore, an agent receives the most benefit if she is the only one
purchasing a signal (i.e. s = 0). Therefore, consider the maximal benefit possible:
T∗(s) = 1:
πBβB(1− βB)2− c
We want to show that for any c, there is a πB such that agents will not purchase a signal.
The condition for that πB is:
πβB(1− βB)2− c = 0




This condition is necessary and sufficient for no agent to purchase a signal. Note that it
is not necessarily the case that there is a sufficiently large value of π for which all agents
will buy a signal. Such a result depends on the value of c.
Proof. Proposition (1)
Let us first find the conditions under which all agents would purchase a signal. If all
agents purchase a signal then T∗ = T. The necessary and sufficient condition for all
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agents purchasing a signal is:
πβB(1− βB)T2(T
2 + (1− T)(1− βB)
) (T




2 + (1− T)(1− βB)
) (T




Therefore if π < π < π, some but not all agents will purchase a signal, and the solution
will be interior. Define the benefit of purchasing as signal as





. At interior solutions, it must be the case that the
marginal investor is indifferent between purchasing a signal and not, so P = c. Since c is
fixed, and since Ps < 0 and Pπ > 0, we have that s∗π > 0, and so we are done.
Proof. Proposition (3)






to be the benefit of purchasing a signal if the
state for which information was purchased realizes. It must be the case that the lower
bound on V(π, 1− π) is 0, as a negative payoff could be avoided by abstention from
purchase.
Further, the upper bound on V(π, 1− π) is achieved when c = 0, and equals Y ≡ P1−δ .





− c + δπBV(k, 1− k) < 0 ≤ πBV(0.5, 0.5).
Proof. Proposition (4)





φp(x)(ask− x)(1−Φdisp,x)(ask)dx(T − 1)
T
2
(µp − bid) =
∫
φp(x)(x− bid)Φdisp,x(bid)dx(T − 1)
The left-hand side of these expressions is the profit earned from noise traders - T2
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purchases or sales, which in expectation are equal to µp. On the right hand side is the
expected loss from adverse selection to informed traders. Market Maker profit is
increasing in the ask and decreasing in the bid, both by extracting more from noise
traders, and giving away less to informed traders.














































Therefore, by similar logic we have that an decrease in σ2γ, holding all other variables
fixed, results in lower profits for the market maker.
In order to increase profits again, the market maker will need to lower the bid and
raise the ask, to make up the difference from noise traders. Thus, an decrease in σ2γ
increases the transfer from noise traders to informed traders in expectation. So U
depends negatively on σ2γ.
Proof. Corollary (2)
The necessary condition is that dUdφ(Bt) => 0. This is trivially true.
Proof. Corollary (3)
If φB,t(B1) > φB,t(B2), then σγ,t(B1) < σγ,t(B2). Then VB1 [φB,t+1(B)] < VB2 [φB,t(B)]. So
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EB1 [φB,t+1(B)] > EB2 [φB,t(B)].
Proof of proposition 5
We will use the following lemma
Lemma 1 (Convexity of the maximum of convex functions). Let fi : X → Y, i ∈ I be a
family of convex functions and f = maxi fi. Then f is convex.
Proof of lemma 1. Consider f = max( f1, f2) with both fi convex. Then for any
x, y, λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that f (λx + (1− λ)y) = fi(λx + (1− λ)y). By
convexity of fi, f (λx + (1− λ)y) ≤ λ fi(x) + (1− λ) fi(y) ≤ λ f (x) + (1− λ) f (y)
Proposition 5 (Convexity of information capacity). I∗ is infinitely differentiable on ∆̊ and is
strictly convex in (α, β)
Proof of proposition 5. To show that I∗ is convex, we show that Iπ(α, β) is convex for any
π. We then use lemma 1 to conclude. Let us denote q = απ + (1− β)(1− π). The
mutual information given a prior π is
Iπ(α, β) = απ ln(α) + (1− α)π ln(1− α)
+ (1− β)(1− π) ln(1− β) + β(1− π) ln(β)
− q ln(q)− (1− q) ln(1− q)
Then for all π, Iπ(.) is twice continuously differentiable in (α, β) and
∂Iπ(α, β)
∂α
=π ln(α)− π ln(1− α)− π ln(q) + π ln(1− q)
∂Iπ(α, β)
∂β
=− (1− π) ln(β)− (1− π) ln(1− β) + (1− π) ln(q)− (1− π) ln(1− q)
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Given the Hessian of Iπ(.), we can directly show that for any π, Iπ(.) is convex, by




























∆ > 0⇔ π[q(1− q)− πα(1− α)](1− π)[q(1− q)− (1− π)β(1− β)]
−α(1− α)β(1− β)π2(1− π)2 > 0
or
∆ > 0⇔ [q(1− q)−πα(1− α)][q(1− q)− (1−π)β(1− β)]− α(1− α)β(1− β)π(1−π) > 0
118
Finally,
∆ > 0⇔ [q2(1− q)2 − πα(1− α)q(1− q)− (1− π)β(1− β)q(1− q)] > 0
which is equivalent to
∆ > 0⇔ [q(1− q)− πα(1− α)− (1− π)β(1− β)] > 0
Plugging in q = απ + (1− π)(1− β) and dividing by π(1− π) yields the condition
∆ > 0⇔ (1− (α + β)2) > 0
Hence, Iπ(.) is convex for all π.
I∗ is therefore the pointwise maximum of convex functions, and is thus convex by
Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6 (Marginal informativeness on the boundaries of ∆̊).






∂β ∈ (0, ∞)
• ∂I
∗(α,β)
∂α = 0⇔ α + β = 1






π∗(α, β) is the prior maximizing I for a given information structure. But we know that
I((α, β); (π, 1− π)) =απ ln(α) + (1− α)π ln(1− α)
+(1− β)(1− π) ln(1− β) + β(1− π) ln(β)
− [απ + (1− β)(1− π)] ln(απ + (1− β)(1− π))
























where q∗ = απ∗ + (1− β)(1− π∗).








In particular, when α = 1, for any β > 0, q∗ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, ln q
∗
1−q∗ is finite.
From equation 5.1, this gives us that ∂I(α,β;π
∗)
∂α evaluated at α = 1 and β > 0 is infinite
while equation 5.2 tells us that at the same point, ∂I(α,β;π
∗)
∂β is finite – and bounded away
from 01.






1− u2α(1−α + o(u)
)
. This expansion implies that π∗(α, 1− α) = 12 by
continuity, and using Equation 5.1 and 5.2, we obtain that the partial derivatives of I∗ are
all null on the inverted diagonal of the square.
The discussion above shows that those partial derivatives are also strictly positive
outside of this diagonal, so that the equivalence stated in the proposition is proven.
1. Note that π∗ and q∗ are related and at the same α, β, we will have π∗ ∈ (0, 1)
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Proof of proposition 7





∀θ > 0, ∀π|(α(θ; π), β(θ; π)) ∈ ∆, ∂α(θ;π)∂π ≥ 0,
∂β(θ;π)
∂π ≤ 0.
Proof. Proof of proposition 7
Assume that the solution to Problem (2.3) is interior and consider the system derived
from the first order conditions:












For clarity, we will denote the (hypothetical) solution to the system (which is unique,
by the concavity of the problem) α∗(π, θ), β∗(π, θ).




θ . This is



















> 0 and ∂I
∗2(α,β)
∂α∂β > 0, β̃(.|θ, π) is a decreasing function of α.
Likewise, α̃ is a decreasing function of β.
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Consider now an increase in π ∈ (0, 1), to π′ > π ∈ (0, 1) for which the solution is
also interior.
Because the loci of β̃(.) and α̃(.) cross only once, α̃(β) →
β→0
1 and β̃(α) →
α→1
β̄ ∈ (0, 1), it
must be that:
β̃(α̃(β|π, θ)|π, θ) > β⇔ β < β∗(π, θ) (5.5)
We also know that ∀β, α̃(β|π′) > α̃(β|π) since ∂I∗∂α increases in α and equation (5.3)
must hold.
Because β̃ is decreasing, we have that for all β
β̃(α̃(β|π′)|π′) < β̃(α̃(β|π)|π′)
One can show as we did for α̃ that ∀α, β̃(α|π′) < β̃(α|π). This implies
β̃(α̃(β|π)|π′) < β̃(α̃(β|π)|π)
Evaluating the latter two equations at β = β∗(π), we get
β̃(α̃(β∗(π)|π′)|π′) < β∗(π)
By relation (5.5), it must be that β∗(π) > β∗(π′)
Likewise, α∗(π) < α∗(π′)
Proof of proposition 8
Proposition 8 (Confidence effect). C(θ; π) →
π→1
0 and C(θ; π) →
π→0
0. Further, α(θ; π) →
π→1
1
and β(θ; π) →
π→1
0; α(θ; π) →
π→0
0 and β(θ; π) →
π→0
1.
Proof of proposition 8. By symmetry, we will concern ourselves with the limits as π → 1.
As a reminder, we also only consider the case where α + β ≥ 1. Fixing θ > 0, we write
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α(π) and β(π) to be the solutions of Problem (2.3) with the dependence in θ implicitly
understood.
Because when the solution is interior, α and β are monotonous in π and they are
bounded, there exists (ᾱ, β̄) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that α(π) →
π→1
ᾱ and β(π) →
π→1
β̄
We show in the following that the only possibility is ᾱ = 1− β̄ so that C →
π→1
0
When the solution is not interior at extreme priors Assume first the that there exists
π̄ > 12 such that ∀π > π̄, the solution to the maximization problem is not interior to
α + β ≥ 1.
If for any 1 ≥ π > π̄, β(π) = 1 (resp. α(π) = 1), it must be the case that α(π) = 0
(resp. β(π) = 0) by Proposition 6 since otherwise, the marginal increase in the objective
function in decreasing β (resp. α) would be infinite. Given these results, the only case
consistent with optimization at π > 12 is α = 1 and β = 0. This yields the desired results.
The only possible other boundary to check is α + β = 1. In that case, I∗(α, β) = 0 and
the only choice consistent with optimization for π > 12 is also α = 1 and β = 0.
When the solution is always interior Assume now that the solution is interior at all
π′s. The first order conditions are given by Equations (5.3) and (5.4).
Equation (5.4) requires that ∂I
∗(α(π),β(π))
∂β →π→1 0.
We know that ∂I
∗(α,β)
∂β = 0⇔ α = 1− β
Hence, ᾱ = 1− β̄. This immediately yields that C(θ; π) →
π→1
0.
We can also show immediately that ᾱ = 1. Assume ᾱ ∈ (0, 1), and consider the first
order condition in Equation (5.3). If it holds for all π, then the RHS converges to 0 since
ᾱ = 1− β̄ while the LHS converges to 1. This is a contradiction. Hence it must be that
ᾱ ∈ {0, 1}. But ᾱ = 0, β̄ = 1 would be obviously inconsistent with maximization in a
neighbourhood of π = 1.
Proof of Proposition 9
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Proposition 9 (Information shutdown at extreme priors). ∀θ, ∃π(θ)|∀π > π(θ),
β(θ; π) < 0.5 and α(θ; π) > 0.5. ∀θ, ∃ ¯̄π(θ)|∀π > ¯̄π(θ), β(θ; π) = 0 and α(θ; π) = 1
Proof of Proposition 9. The first part of the proposition follows immediately from 8, the
continuity of the solutions and the fact that β(0.5) = α(0.5) > 0.5.
For the second part, we show that in a rational inattention model, β = 0 for high
priors. We then show that when β = 0 in a rational inattention model, it has to be 0 in
the inattentive valuation model.
The rational inattention problem with a fixed cost of attention θ is described in
Problem (2.2)





. The first order conditions, provided the solution is interior, yield
α(1− q)
q(1− α) = a
βq
(1− β)(1− q) = a
Equalizing the two expressions for q1−q , we have that
α






β + a2(1− β)




β + a2(1− β) + (1− β)(1− π)
1− q = βπ
β + a2(1− β) + β(1− π)
From
βq
(1− β)(1− q) = a
and substituting for q and 1− q We have that
β
1− β ·
a2(1− β)π + (1− β)(1− π)(β + a2(1− β))
β(1− π)(β + a2(1− β)) + βπ = a
Or
a2π + (1− π)(β + a2(1− β))
(1− π)(β + a2(1− β)) + π = a
Thus
a2 + β[1− π][1− a2] = a[π + a2(1− π)] + aβ[1− π][1− a2]
Or
β · (1− π)(a2 − 1)(a− 1) = a[π + a2(1− π)− a]
We also have that





(1− π)(a2 − 1)
This expression is not negative only if π1−π ≤ a or π <
a
1+a . Therefore, for all π ≥
a
1+a ,
the solution is not interior and β = 0
Now, let us write
VRI =max
α,β










By definition, ∀α, β, π, g(α, β, π) ≤ h(α, β, π).
Hence, by taking the max on both sides with respect to α, β, we have that for all π,
V IV ≤ VRI
We know that for π̃ ≥ π̄ = a1+a , VRI = π since α = 1, β = 0 and
I((α, β); (π̃, 1− π̃)) = 0. Hence, for π̃ ≥ π̄, V IV ≤ π. But setting α = 1 and β = 0 in the
IV problem yields a value of π̃. Hence, it realizes the maximum.
Therefore, we have that when under RI, α = 1 and β = 0, then it must be the case
under IV. In particular, for all π ≥ a1+a , the solution of the inattentive valuation problem
is not interior and β = 0, α = 1
Proof of Proposition 10
Proposition 10. ∀θ > 0, ∃π̃(θ) > 12 |
∣∣∣π − 12 ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣π̃(θ)− 12 ∣∣∣⇒ αd(θ; π) + βd(θ; π) = 1.
Moreover, ∀θ > 0, π̃(θ) = ¯̄π(θ)
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Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the dynamic setting under Rational Inattention:
V(π) = max
α,β












− θ I(α, β, π)
Now consider V under no attention (α + β = 1), (immediately we get πa = πb = π):
V(π) = max
α,β
πα + (1− π)β + δ[qV(π) + (1− q)V(π)]
V(π)(1− δ) = max
α,β




Now, since V is continuous, and we are trying to show a discontinuity in the first order
conditions (a point at which they stop holding), there must be a π̃ such that for all
π > π̃, I(π) = 0. We know that π̃ = 1 is a solution to this, but we want to check whether
there is another solution where π̃ < 1. Therefore, V(π̃) must satisfy the first order
conditions and satisfy V(π̃) = π̃1−δ . If we can find this π̃ we are done. Importantly, at π̃,
V(π̃a) = V(π̃b) = π̃ and V′(π̃a) = V′(π̃b):
V(π̃) = max
α,β












− θ I(α, β, π̃)


































The first order condition with respect to β becomes:


























This is identical to the static case and thus, the exact same proof will work. Namely, we
know that there is a point π̃ such that the first order conditions above are both satisfied
with equality, and α + β = 1 - it will be exactly the π̃ at which the first order conditions of
the static case break down.
The same logic as the above for the Inattentive Value formulation will show that at a
hypothetical shutdown point, the FOC for the dynamic and static case become the same.
We know that under the FOC for the static case, that there is a shutdown point that
occurs before that of Rational Inattention. Therefore, the same shutdown point must
exist in the dynamic case.
Therefore, such a shutdown point is defined in the same way in the dynamic case as
in the static for both rational inattention and inattentive valuation.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proposition 11. ∀θ > 0, α(θ; .5) < αd(θ; .5) and β(θ; .5) < βd(θ; .5).
Proof of Proposition 11. Under static case we get q = π = π∗ = 0.5, α = β and FOC:

















Under the dynamic case, we get that q = π = π∗ = 0.5, α = β, V(πa) = V(πb) (due to
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V′(π̃a) > 0, as is shown below, and so the amount on the left hand side of the equation is
larger that in the static case, hence requiring a larger value of α to satisfy equality.
To try to show that V′(π) > 0 when π > 0.5:










αq− απ(α + β− 1)
q










(1− q)(1− α)− (1− α)π(1− α− β)
1− q ]
It is easy to see two things immediately. If π is past the shutdown point, then V′(π) = 1,
because α + β = 1 and α 6= β. Second, V′(0.5) = 0. Now, we can get the rest simply
showing that the Value function is convex.
We show that the value function of our problem is convex by the following reasoning:
• For any V convex, TV is convex
• Therefore, for any V convex, T(n)V is convex
• Because the set of convex functions on [0, 1] is closed, lim
π→1
T(n)V is convex
• Hence, the value function which solves our problem is convex
The main step to prove is the first one.
Let us thus show that if V is convex in π, then TV is also convex in π. To show that,
we will first show that the function inside the maximum is convex in π for any α, β. As
the maximum of a family of convex functions, TV will thus be convex in π
Because the first part of the function is linear in π, we can focus on the term in square
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brackets to show the convexity. Let us define, in particular
f (π) =
[














(1− α)(1− q) + (1− α)π(α + β− 1)
(1− q)2
Hence,





αq− απ(α + β− 1)
q
+ V′(πb)
(1− α)(1− q) + (1− α)π(α + β− 1)
1− q
and
f ′′(π) = (α + β− 1)[V′(πa)αq− απ(α + β− 1)
q2
−V′(πb) (1− α)(1− q) + (1− α)π(α + β− 1)
(1− q)2 ]
−V′(πa) (α + β− 1)(αq− απ(α + β− 1))
q2
+ V′(πb)
















The terms in V′ cancel out and we are only left with the terms in V′′ weighted by
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positive numbers. Hence, f ′′ inherits the sign of V′′ if it is constant. In particular, f is
convex if V′′ is convex.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proposition 10. ∀θ > 0, ∃π̃(θ) > 12 |
∣∣∣π − 12 ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣π̃(θ)− 12 ∣∣∣⇒ αd(θ; π) + βd(θ; π) = 1.
Moreover, ∀θ > 0, π̃(θ) = ¯̄π(θ)
Proof of Proposition 12. Take a unit interval of agents who all have a prior of π0 = 0.5.
Since we know that agents pay more attention to signals in the forward-looking problem
than in the myopic, we have that:














Remember that π0 = q0 = 0.5, which means that the above equation simplifies to the
condition that π1 ≥ α or π1 ≤ 1− α depending on what signal is observed. But
remember also that the shutdown point is (at least) the same as α(0.5)! Therefore, for
agents starting at 0.5, they will observe one signal, either A or B, update, and then shut
down.
5.2 DYNAMIC HETEROGENEOUS SIGNAL ACQUISITION
In this section, I will consider the dynamic formulation of the simple model, while
still allowing agents to behave heterogeneously with regards to purchasing signals. For
simplicity I will set β = 0.5.
Assume that πt+1 = 0.5 + (s/2)ρ where ρ < 1. Unlike the representative agent,
heterogeneous agents do not internalize the long-term consequences of their individual
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decisions.Then an individual agent faces the following problem in terms of signal
acquisition:




2 + (1− T)(1− βB)
) (T
2 + (1− T)
) − c
+δV(πt+1, 1− πt+1), δV(πt+1, 1− πt+1)
}





2 + (1− T∗)(1− βB)
) (T∗
2 + (1− T∗)

















4− 2T∗ > c
Therefore the equilibrium level of s for interior solutions is defined as:
πtT∗ = c(4− 2T∗)
T∗(πt + 2c) = 4c
T






1− T = s
This is linear in πt. Therefore, the shape of πt+1 as a function of πt is as follows. For very
low levels of πt, πt+1 = 0.5, for intermediate levels, πt+1 = 0.5 +
sρ
2 , and depending on
parameter values, for high values of πt, πt+1 = 0.5(1 + ρ). Visually, it would look like a
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straight line at 0.5 kinked into a positively sloped line at π = 2c, and rising until
π = (4−2T)cT , at which point it remains at πt+1 = 0.5(1 + ρ) until πt = 1.
Intersections of this ‘policy function’ with the 45-degree line determine steady states,
of a sort. There are four types of intersections:
1. πt = πt+1 = 0.5. For sufficiently high values of c, agents will be uncertain forever,
caught in an uncertainty trap. This steady state is absorbing and inescapable.




8c(1−T) < 1. This steady state is absorbing, but not inescapable.




8c(1−T) > 1. This steady state not absorbing.
4. π = 1+ρ2 . This steady state is absorbing but not inescapable.
The first and the last steady state are what remain when we switch from
heterogeneous decision making to a representative agent.
5.3 INATTENTION
Here the model will be restructured to allow for a more micro founded version of
attention - namely the Inattentive Valuation structure of Woodford (2012). The basic
versions - the timeline, environment and asset all are structured and behave in the same
way - the change will come in the attentional choices and the risk aversion of informed
traders.
5.3.1 Attentional Choices
In order to make micro founding attentional cost structure interesting, we need to
expand the state-space of possible accuracies. Therefore, the definitions of signals for
traders are:
αi = P(signal = 0|ηB = 0) = P(signal = 1|ηB = 1)
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The public signal is again defined as:
βi = P(signal = 0|ηB = 0) = P(signal = 1|ηB = 1)
We will assume, without loss of generality that α and β are both weakly greater than 0.5.
5.3.2 Informed Traders
We will solve the problem of the informed traders by working backwards. Informed
traders, in period 1, have already made their attentional choices, and have received their




E[wk] s.t. w = z(Bi + ηi − P) + N & 0 < k < 1
Where P is the price at which agents can choose to trade (will be different depending on
whether agents want to buy or sell), N is an initial endowment of cash, and k is a
measure of risk-aversion. The solution for demand is:
z =
N − Nγ




(B + 1− P)µ
) 1
k−1
Where µ is an agent’s idiosyncratic belief that ηi = 1 which is informed by his own
attentional choice, his signal, and the price.
We will assume here for the sake of tractability, that noise traders will participate, on
average, as much as informed traders. This is not a crucial assumption.
5.3.3 Equilibrium
Given the way we have set up the model so far, we know that, at the beginning of
period 1, there are two groups of traders - one group comprised of agents who receive
the signal ’1’, and the noise traders that mimic them, and one group comprised of agents
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who receive the signal ’0’, and the noise traders that mimic them.
First assume that market making sector receives a signal that ‘β′ = 1 - and it knows
the signal to have accuracy βi:




P(buy|ηi = 0) =
f (·)T
2
+ (1− T)(1− αi)
That is the number of uninformed buys T/2 is unrelated to the fundamental value of the
asset, but the number of informed buys does vary. The market making sector weights











+ (1− T)(1− αi)
)
Then we can calculate the following:
P(ηi = 1|buy) =




2 + (1− T)αiβi
f (·)T
2 + (1− T)(βiαi + (1− βi)(1− αi))
This value, as proven by Glosten and Milgrom is exactly equal to the ask price charged
by the market making sector under perfect competition. Therefore we can calculate the
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following four values:
ask1 = B +
(
f (·)T




2 + (1− T)(βiαi + (1− βi)(1− αi))
bid1 = B +
(
f (·)T




2 + (1− T)(βi(1− αi) + (1− βi)αi)
ask0 = B +
(
f (·)T




2 + (1− T)((1− βi)αi + βi(1− αi))
bid0 = B +
(
f (·)T




2 + (1− T)(βiαi + (1− βi)(1− αi))
A first, quick result, is the movement of the spread (difference between the ask and
the bid) with public and private information. As the market makers become better
informed relative to the trader, spreads decline, and as the market makers become worse
informed relative to the trader, spreads increase, as a protective measure.
Agents will buy if the ask is below their updated expectation of η, and will sell if the
bid is above their expectation:
E[η = 1|‘α′ = 1, ‘β′ = 1] = µ11 =
αβ
αβ + (1− α)(1− β)
E[η = 1|‘α′ = 1, ‘β′ = 0] = µ10 =
α(1− β)
α(1− β) + β(1− α)
E[η = 1|‘α′ = 0, ‘β′ = 1] = µ01 =
β(1− α)
β(1− α) + α(1− β)
E[η = 1|‘α′ = 0, ‘β′ = 0] = µ00 =
(1− α)(1− β)
αβ + (1− α)(1− β)
The updated expectations satisfy the conditions of the equilibrium (see appendix for
proof).
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5.3.4 Attentional Choice for Informed Traders
Utility for the informed traders is defined as follows:
U11 = µ11(αi, β j)(z11(αi, β j)(B + 1− ask1(αi, β j)) + N)k
+(1− µ11(αi, β j))(z11(αi, β j)(B− ask1(αi, β j)) + N)k
We can show that (Uij)α > 0 for all i, j, which just means that overall utility:
U = (U11 + U00)(αiβ j + (1− αi)(1− β j)) + (U10 + U01)(αi(1− β j) + (1− αi)β j)
depends positively on α. This means that agents want to get accurate signals. Informed
traders know the value of π, and the value of θ, and therefore know what β∗L and β
∗
H are.
Therefore their problem now becomes:
max
αL,αH
(1− π)U(αH, βH) + πU(αL, βL)− θT I∗(αL, αH)
where θT is an exogenously given marginal cost of increasing their channel capacity.
There is a marginal cost to increasing the channel capacity (as described by I∗) which
would increase accuracy. In this formulation of the market, the assumption to model
attentional choice in this way allows us to have the attentional choice be decision
theoretic as opposed to game theoretic - α will be a function of β but not vice-versa. The
constraint function is defined as:
I((αH, αL); π) = −EP(x,r)[ln(P(x))− ln(P(x|r))]
π∗ = argmaxI((αH, αL); π)
I∗(αH, αL) = I((αH, αL); π∗)
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where x is the state that realizes, and r is the representation perceived by the agent. In
this particular case, the functional form will be:
I∗(αH, αL) = ln(2) + ln
(
eαL ln(αL)+(1−αL) ln(1−αL) + eαH ln(αH)+(1−αH) ln(1−αH)
)
There is an important reason as to why we have chosen to constraint the channel
capacity, as originally formulated by Claude Elwood Shannon 2001 and Woodford
2012a, as opposed to the more canonical constraint on mutual information as formulated
by C. A. Sims 2003 and others. As was shown in Woodford 2012a and also in Sundaresan
and Turban 2014, there is a large array of experimental and neurological evidence
showing that low probability events are less well identified than high probability events.
Using this methodology allows us to generate ’countercyclical’ dispersion. For the
technical properties, characteristics, and proofs of I∗ such as convexity, monotonicity
and the like, please refer to Woodford 2012a or Sundaresan and Turban 2014.
5.3.5 Results
Here we will simulate the model for the following parameters. BL = BH = 0 N = 10
T = 0.35 θT = 1 θM = 1.3 k = 0.8 The first set of variables that deserve attention are
those of αL, αH, βL and βH. These are plotted in Figure 5.6.
As we can see, both α and β are increasing in the likelihood of the state. So, as 1− π
increases, αH and βH increase and αL and βL decrease. As we can see, for very low values
of π, αL = 0.5. Volatility obviously tracks β, but again, the general shape is that as the
likelihood of a state increases, the expected volatility upon its realization decreases. As α
and β are both increasing in 1− π, uncertainty will follow the opposite path - as we have
seen, uncertainty is decreasing in both α and β. The spread shows the tension between
the two forces that drive the liquidity dry-ups. The spread decreases in the high state, as
the market making sector receives better signals and requires less adverse-selection
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protection. in the low state, the spread initial increases for this same reason, but then
starts to fall because both the market makers and the traders are receiving lower quality
information, so traders demand less and less risk. Dispersion here is decreasing in the
high state, as both α and β are increasing. It follows a hump-shape in the low state as
agents at first start to receive more information from their own signals, as opposed to the
public ones, but eventually declines, as all agents are equally uninformed.
5.4 OPTIONS VOLUME
The key mechanism in the model of this paper is that of inattention, or informational
investment. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure I am aware of for such a variable.
However, in this appendix, I consider a proxy: hedging.
5.4.1 Interpretation
One could think of purchasing informational investment or paying attention, as a
form of reducing conditional volatility or uncertainty. Therefore, purchasing securities
that reduce exposure to volatility could be seen to have a direct correlation with the
mechanism utilized in the model. After speaking with several investors, including some
portfolio managers and a hedge fund manager, a common pattern that emerged was that
the way in which they prepared for the unexpected was to utilize options to develop a
long position in volatility. Therefore, we will turn to options data, to answer these
questions.
5.4.2 Dataset
The dataset used here is from MarketDataExpress, and provides information on the
types and sizes of trades in the SPX options index at a daily frequency. Specifically, for
each day, the dataset provides volumes for all non market-making entities four different
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types of trade: open buy, open sell, close buy, and close sell for puts and calls at every
strike. An open trade is one where the entity is taking on risk, while a close trade is one
where the entity is closing out an existing position.
5.4.3 Strategy
Given the data above, a useful way to proxy how prepared agents are for different
events would be to construct net long positions in options (either puts or calls). Given
four different buckets (strikes less than 90% of the value of the underlying, strikes
between 90% and 100% of the underlying, strikes between 100% and 110% of the
underlying, and strikes over 110% of the underlying) one could create two variables per
bucket - subtracting the number of open sells from open buys in each bucket to create
open interest and subtracting the number of close sells from close buys in each bucket to
assess reduction of risk. Then for each date, the sum of those buckets for all options
traded before that date that expire after that date would be a measure of preparedness. I
drop the first 500 days to allow for the buildup of a portfolio. Then the following
regression could be estimated:
vixt = α0 + αi{volumeit}+ controls + εt
The desire is to understand, controlling for the ex-ante probabilities of events, changes in
volatility, and the underlying, etc. whether an extra unit of preparedness - an extra unit
of volatility protection negatively correlated with the level of the vix. So the null
hypothesis is that αi = 0 against the alternative that it is significantly negative.
5.4.4 Results
The three columns of table 5.6 correspond to days on which the S&P moved down,
the days on which it moved up, and all days. With the exception of open long positions
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in options that have strikes between 100% and 110% of the underlying, every single
other type of long position in options mitigates - is negatively correlated with - the level
of the VIX. Controlling for this, we still see that the underlying is negatively correlated
with the VIX, and that the probabilities of the intraday low and intraday high are
negatively correlated as well - with the negative event having a larger impact than the
positive event - maintaining the central result that ex-ante unlikely events spike the VIX.
5.5 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION
Suppose that instead of trying to provide as accurate a signal as possible, the public












Compare the predictions of this objective function to that of Section 1.4. We use the
same parameters as before in Figure 5.19.2 One can see how agents (both public and
private) choose to invest in information. As before, conditional on these selections, one
can see what the expectations for credit spreads, levels of borrowing, demand for
financial assets, bid-ask spreads, uncertainty, volatility, and dispersion of beliefs are.
Overall, it is evident that the general patterns are very similar to the case considered
in the main body of the paper. Let’s examine each of these graphs in turn. First, it is
evident that the the graphs in (a) are not symmetric. Rather σβ is skewed towards the
2. The parameter values here are Bt = 10, σ2η = 4, σ2ε = 4, cp = 0.0002, δ = 0.95, c = 1, r f = 0.03, ρ = 0.6,
α = 0.6. α and ρ are selected with some calibration in mind, while ση and σε are set equal to indicate that
the uncertainty from period to period is not more or less than stage to stage. The rest of the parameters will
deliver similar results.
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left, while σγ is skewed towards the right. The public entity is trying to minimize credit
spreads which are naturally higher for lower values of Vt - so information is more
valuable to the public entity at lower values of Vt. This doesn’t imply that public
information is good for unexpected negative shocks, rather that it is better than it is for
equally unexpected positive shocks. Conversely, since public and private information
are strategic substitutes, private agents will choose to be better informed, on average, for
positive shocks than for negative ones. That is, for a normal distribution of shocks,
informational investment will be highest near the mean, and will deteriorate quickly for
the tails. The statistics are virtually identical to the other objective function, save for the
skewness in the shapes.
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5.6 FIGURES











(a) Daily values of VIX with markers for key rare events
(b) Monthly US Corporate Credit Spreads, NYSE Margin Debt, and I/B/E/S Dispersion of Forecasts



















Public signal about ηB
revealed.
Market Making sector
sets bid and ask.




























Public signal about ηB
revealed.
Market Making sector
sets bid and ask.






Figure 5.3: Timeline of within-period actions and decisions
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period













(a) Temporary Uncertainty for Low Information Costs
period













(b) Uncertainty Persists for High Information Costs
Figure 5.4: Uncertainty Reactions in Dynamic Model
(a) Informational Investment (σ2γ, σ2β) (b) Debt Level and Credit Spread
(c) Bid-Ask Spread, Uncertainty, Expected
Volatility, and Dispersion
(d) Asset-Demand (Total number of shares
bought/sold)
Figure 5.5: Simulation of Continuous State Model
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Figure 5.6: Impulse Responses of Continuous State Model to a three standard deviation drop and rebound in the
asset’s value.
Figure 5.7: Closing levels of VIX as a function of the ex-ante probabilities of price changes. Probabilities are arranged
such that most likely events are in the center, and least likely are in the tails.
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VIX Quantile

























Figure 5.8: Probability statistics with 95% percentile bounds a function of VIX quantiles
Vix









Figure 5.9: Coefficient of volatility on average intraday probability with 95% confidence interval as a function of VIX
quintiles
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Figure 5.10: Monthly simulation of the VIX using probabilities as input
(a) Simulation of Credit Spreads (b) Simulation of Risk Appetite
(c) Simulation of Dispersion of Beliefs
Figure 5.11: Additional Simulations
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Potential Values of V











Total Production With Uncertainty
Total Production Without Uncertainty
Figure 5.12: Total Production with and without Uncertainty
Potential Values of V









(a) SDF with Uncertainty
Potential Values of V









Stochastic Discount Factor Without Uncertainty
(b) SDF without Uncertainty
Figure 5.13: SDFs with and without Uncertainty
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Percentage Change







(a) Risk Neutral vs. Physical
Percentage Change













Figure 5.14: Physical and Risk-Neutral Distributions










(a) Non-Paramterically Estimated Stochastic
Discount Factor










(b) SDF when controlling for conditional uncer-
tainty
Figure 5.15: Nonparametric SDFs
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Days















(a) Daily using probabilities as input
Days















(b) Daily using price changes as input
Figure 5.16: Forecasting with Daily Data
Weeks















(a) Weekly using probabilities as input
Weeks















(b) Forecasting with Weekly Data
Figure 5.17: Weekly using price changes as input
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Student Version of MATLAB
(a) Attention (α, β)










Student Version of MATLAB
(b) Volatility (β(1− β))












Student Version of MATLAB
(c) Uncertainty (µ(1− µ))














Student Version of MATLAB
(d) Spread














Student Version of MATLAB
(e) Dispersion (Var(µ))

















Student Version of MATLAB
(f) Volume
Figure 5.18: Results under Risk Aversion and Microfounded Cost of Attention
Potential Values of V













(a) Attention (σ2γ, σ2β)
Potential Values of V













(b) Debt Level and Credit Spread
Potential Values of V













(c) Bid-Ask Spread, Uncertainty, Expected
Volatility, and Dispersion
Potential Values of V












Number of Shares Traded
(d) Asset-Demand (Total number of shares
bought/sold)
Figure 5.19: Simulation of Continuous State Model
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Figure 5.20: Isoquants for I∗
(a) Information capacity (b) Information structure
Figure 5.21: Solutions of Problem (2.3) with θ = 1, as a function of π.
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.22: Evolution of different starting values of π over 8 periods where θ = 10















Student Version of MATLAB















Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.23: Evolution of π for agents under different values of θ.



















Student Version of MATLAB



















Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.24: Finishing histograms for 100 agents starting at π0 = 0.5 for different values of θ
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Student Version of MATLAB

















Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.25: Evolution of priors for 50 agents starting at π0 = 0.5 and θ = 10 for different values of q.
Figure 5.26: 90-Day Cupom Cambial (Spread Between Onshore and Offshore Dollar Rates - %)
Note: Red squares are a tightening in capital controls and green circles are a loosening in capital controls.
Source: Bloomberg.
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Figure 5.27: Brazil - Foreign Net Inflows (Seasonally Adjusted)
Figure 5.28: Brazil - GDP (Annualized Quarterly Change)
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Figure 5.29: Brazil - Private Consumption and Fixed Investment (Annualized Quarterly Change)
Figure 5.30: Brazil - Capital Goods Production/Capital Goods Imports and Fixed Investment (Annualized Quarterly
Change)
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Figure 5.31: Real Fixed Investment - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
Figure 5.32: Real Fixed Investment - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
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Figure 5.33: Real Fixed Investment - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
Figure 5.34: Real Private Consumption - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
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Figure 5.35: Real Private Consumption - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
Figure 5.36: Real Private Consumption - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
Figure 5.37: Real Exports and Imports - Brazil vs Synthetic Brazil
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Figure 5.38: Real Exports and Imports - Placebo Gaps
Note: The thick black line represents the gap between real and synthetic data data for Brazil while the light
gray lines represent the gap for all other countries in the sample.
Figure 5.39: Real Exports - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
Figure 5.40: Real Imports - Brazil vs Synthetic Alternatives
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5.7 TABLES
Variable Mean StDev Min Max
Vix 21.07 8.38 9.89 80.86
Volatility 16.67 10.65 1.79 110.04
Volume 244,924 171,056 1,499 1,145,623
Physical Prob of Intraday Low 10.26% 5.59% 3.20e-7% 23.17%
Physical Prob of Intraday High 9.27% 5.09% 3.02e-5% 24.44%
Risk-Neutral Prob of Intraday Low 8.56% 4.55% 6.14e-5% 31.12%
Risk-Neutral Prob of Intraday High 8.15% 4.54% 2.15e-4% 35.08%
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Vix Vix Vix Vix Vix Vix
Min -0.00416*** -0.00556*** -0.00398*** -0.00361*** -0.00188*** -0.00188***
(0.00108) (0.00132) (0.000648) (0.000644) (0.000669) (0.000667)
L.Min -0.00278*** -0.00242*** -0.00226*** -0.00240*** -0.00241***
(0.00103) (0.000636) (0.000629) (0.000635) (0.000636)
Close -3.670*** -3.668*** -3.640*** -3.614***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.0993) (0.0999)






Constant -0.000144 -0.000120 0.000755 0.000750 0.000753 0.000769
(0.000870) (0.000866) (0.000578) (0.000577) (0.000572) (0.000573)
Observations 4,535 4,527 4,527 4,527 4,527 4,509
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regression is run in first differences, and Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. Min is the lower of the ex-ante probability of the intraday high and
the ex-ante probability of the intraday low. Volume is the volume of trade in the S&P index; Volatility is the size of the intraday price movement; Close is the closing value of the
S&P index; Skew is the skewness of the VIX as calculated by the CBOE Data is at a daily frequency, and probabilities are risk-neutral, extracted from options data.
Table 5.2: Effect of price changes on the VIX
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Vix Vix Vix Vix Vix Vix
Min -0.00575*** -0.00670*** -0.00576*** -0.00529*** -0.00168 -0.00177
(0.00118) (0.00145) (0.000885) (0.000893) (0.00117) (0.00117)
L.Min -0.00176 -0.00293*** -0.00277*** -0.00297*** -0.00300***
(0.00119) (0.000733) (0.000730) (0.000729) (0.000729)
Close -3.695*** -3.693*** -3.664*** -3.640***
(0.100) (0.100) (0.0992) (0.0996)






Constant 0.000104 0.000133 0.000860 0.000853 0.000854 0.000872
(0.000865) (0.000863) (0.000574) (0.000573) (0.000568) (0.000570)
Observations 4,541 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,519
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regression is run in first differences, and Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. Min is the lower of the ex-ante probability of the intraday high and
the ex-ante probability of the intraday low. Volume is the volume of trade in the S&P index; Volatility is the size of the intraday price movement; Close is the closing value of the
S&P index; Skew is the skewness of the VIX as calculated by the CBOE; Data is at a daily frequency, and probabilities are physical, extracted from a kernel density estimation of
historical distributions.
Table 5.3: Effect of price changes on the VIX
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES max avg stdev
quantile -0.00115*** -0.000663*** -0.000155***
(7.63e-05) (2.22e-05) (1.10e-05)
Constant 0.131*** 0.0375*** 0.0283***
(0.00159) (0.000540) (0.000222)
Observations 4,534 4,656 4,534
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the results of three regressions. Quantile is a ordinal variable measuring the value of the VIX in 32 buckets. Max is the probability of the most likely price
movement in a given day. Avg is the average weighted probability of a price movement. Stdev is the standard deviation of probabilities of price movements. All probabilities are
risk-neutral extracted from options data. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.




Percentage Change in S&P -0.000675 -0.00556
(0.00171) (0.00491)
Change in Physical VIX 0.0908***
(0.0285)
Change in Probability -80.47*
(41.80)





Number of index 31 31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the results of two panel regressions. Each column corresponds to a different set of regressors. The dependent variable is the estimated stochastic
discount factor, the time frequency is daily, and the cross sectional index is the size of a price movement in percentage terms (divided into 31 buckets). The regression is run in
first differences, and Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
Table 5.5: Effect of price changes on the VIX
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES vix vix vix
volume 2.13e-05*** 1.88e-05*** 2.13e-05***
(1.92e-06) (2.10e-06) (2.41e-06)
Open1 -5.16e-06** -5.55e-06** -2.68e-06
(2.08e-06) (2.26e-06) (2.60e-06)
Open2 2.65e-06 5.07e-06 2.52e-06
(2.87e-06) (3.13e-06) (3.52e-06)
Open3 -3.45e-05*** -3.31e-05*** -3.34e-05***
(1.63e-06) (1.87e-06) (1.87e-06)
Open4 -9.26e-06*** -8.39e-06*** -7.90e-06***
(9.07e-07) (9.91e-07) (1.16e-06)
Close1 -4.44e-05*** -4.10e-05*** -4.28e-05***
(2.89e-06) (3.20e-06) (3.49e-06)
Close2 -2.88e-05*** -2.49e-05*** -2.70e-05***
(3.28e-06) (3.52e-06) (4.07e-06)
Close3 -4.21e-05*** -4.06e-05*** -4.02e-05***
(2.26e-06) (2.59e-06) (2.59e-06)
Close4 -2.69e-05*** -2.43e-05*** -2.62e-05***
(1.47e-06) (1.57e-06) (1.97e-06)
SPdiff -0.0193*** 0.115*** -0.114***
(0.00715) (0.0151) (0.0159)
volatility 0.207*** 0.198*** 0.178***
(0.0201) (0.0234) (0.0255)
plow -97.51*** -90.42*** -101.2***
(9.049) (10.37) (12.58)
phigh -37.64*** -21.14** -53.01***
(9.293) (10.09) (14.08)
Constant 17.89*** 16.50*** 17.71***
(0.866) (0.908) (1.116)
Observations 4,166 2,225 1,940
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the results of three regressions. Each column corresponds to a different subset of the data - these first is for the whole sample, the second is for days on
which the S&P index closed up, the second is for days on which it closed down. The dependent variable is the estimated stochastic discount factor, the time frequency is daily.
The dependent variable is the change in the level of the VIX - the regression is run in first differences and Newey West Standard Errors are reported. Volume is the volume of
trade in the S&P index, SPdiff is the first difference of the S&P index’s value, volatility is the intraday price change, plow and phigh are the ex-ante probabilities of the intraday
low and high respectively, calculated with the risk neutral distribution. The Open variables are the net positions of the market in different ranges of strikes for positions that have
taken on risk. The Close variables are the net levels of positions that were closed out in different ranges of strikes. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5%
level; and * at the 10% level.
Table 5.6: Effect of price changes on the VIX
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Date Capital Control Measures
10/19/09 2% tax on portfolio inflows (equity & fixed income)
11/18/09 1.5% tax on the conversion of ADRs into local equities
10/04/10 Tax on fixed income inflows raised to 4% tax
10/18/10 Tax on fixed income inflows raised to 6% tax
01/06/11 Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank FX positions > US$ 3 billions
03/28/11 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 1 year
04/06/11 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 2 years
07/08/11 Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank FX positions > US$ 1 billion
07/26/11 1% tax on long notional Brazilian Real derivatives positions
12/01/11 Elimination of tax on portfolio equity inflows
02/29/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 3 years
03/01/12 Restrictions on anticipation of exporter payments for up to 1 year
03/09/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans with maturity below 5 years
03/15/12 Tax on derivatives set to zero for hedging by exporters
06/13/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans restricted to maturities below 2 years
12/04/12 Anticipation of exporter payments for up to 5 years are allowed
12/05/12 6% entry tax on foreign loans restricted to maturities below 1 year
06/04/13 Elimination of tax on fixed income flows
Source:
Adapted from Chamon and Garcia (2015).
Table 5.7: Capital Controls Measures in Brazil - 2009-2012
Real Fixed Investment Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 11034
Real GDP growth 4.2 5.2
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 20.6
Capital Goods Imports (% of total) 37.3 32.5
Current Account (% of GDP) -0.3 -0.3
FDI (% of GDP) 1.1 4.6
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 1.8
Table 5.8: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
Real Private Consumption Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 8665
Real GDP growth 4.2 6.3
Inflation 4.6 4.6
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 64.2
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 21.8
Consumption Goods Imports (% of total) 12.3 17.0
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.7
Table 5.9: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
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Exports Volume Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 12892
Real GDP growth 4.2 2.9
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 22.9
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 61.9
Consumption Goods Exports (% of total) 28.5 26.1
Intermediate Goods Exports (% of total) 47.9 48.0
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.5
Table 5.10: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
Imports Volume Brazil Synthetic Brazil
GDP per capita (PPP) 9236 12859
Real GDP growth 4.2 4.4
Investment (% of GDP) 20.6 21.4
Consumption (% of GDP) 70.2 61.3
Consumption Goods Imports (% of total) 12.3 16.0
Intermediate Goods Imports (% of total) 50.4 47.2
Commodity Exports Price (Average % change) 2.7 2.3
Table 5.11: Pre-Capital Controls Imposition Characteristics - 2006:1-2009:3
Variable Total Sample Pre-Controls Post-Controls
Investment/Total Assets 0.0599 0.0709 0.0490
Tobin’s Q 18.45 35.65 1.24
Sales/Total Assets 0.754 0.799 0.707
Number of BNDES Firms 29 28 31
Total BNDES Size of Loans 18,371 13,193 23,548
Table 5.12: Summary Statistics
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Variable Definition
Assets (total) Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment
in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property,
plant, and equipment and other assets. Adjusted for inflation.
Capital Expenditure Funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated
with acquisitions. Includes, but not restricted to: Additions to
property, plant and equipment; Investments in machinery and
equipment.
Depreciation Cost of a depreciable asset to the accounting periods covered dur-
ing its expected useful life to a business. It is a non-cash charge
for use and obsolescence of an asset.
Depletion Cost allocation for natural resources such as oil and mineral de-
posits.
Amortization Cost allocation for intangible assets such as patents and leasehold
improvements, trademarks, bookplates, tools and film cost.
Net Sales Net sales or revenues of the company.
Cash Sum of cash and short term investments.
Cash Flow Sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits. It is the
cash flow of the company.
Market Value Market price-year end multiplied by common shares outstand-
ing.
Table 5.13: Description of the Variables
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.0760** 0.113*** 0.0773***
(0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0287)
After -0.0139*** -0.0180*** -0.0202***
(0.00356) (0.00376) (0.00410)
After*BNDES 0.0125** 0.0131** 0.0124***
(0.00506) (0.00550) (0.00473)






Constant 0.0529*** 0.00423 0.0558***
(0.00438) (0.0189) (0.00472)
Observations 1,384 1,384 1,384
Number of firms 243 243 243
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.14: Results - Baseline
Small Large
Average Size 357,498 10,060,000
Average Investment/Assets 0.045 0.072
Table 5.15: Summary Statistics - Breakdown by Size
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Small Large Small Large Small Large
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.295 0.158** 0.244 0.118* 0.426 -0.00257
(0.245) (0.0655) (0.188) (0.0649) (0.269) (0.0729)
After -0.008** -0.0173*** -0.0122*** -0.0223*** -0.0115** -0.0270***
(0.00416) (0.00602) (0.00428) (0.00692) (0.00516) (0.00696)
After*BNDES 0.0119 0.0176** 0.0129* 0.0183*** 0.0107 0.0142**
(0.00774) (0.00757) (0.00747) (0.00707) (0.00715) (0.00611)
Cashflow 0.000263** 0.0973 0.000245 0.0842 0.000124 0.117





Constant 0.0282*** 0.0487*** -0.0354 0.0202 0.0246* 0.0668***
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Observations 650 734 650 734 650 734
Number of firms 124 119 124 119 124 119
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.16: Results - Breakdown by Size
Small Exporters Large Exporters
Number 160 110
Average Size 2,346,970 9,396,383
Average Investment/Assets 0.0631 0.0536
Table 5.17: Summary Statistics - Breakdown by Size of Exports
Small Exporters Large Exporters Small Exporters Large Exporters Small Exporters Large Exporters
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment
Invt−1 0.0632* 0.763*** 0.0943*** 0.726*** 0.0618* 0.824***
(0.0374) (0.161) (0.0318) (0.146) (0.0345) (0.187)
After -0.0168*** 0.00127 -0.0208*** -0.00654 -0.0229*** -0.00210
(0.00588) (0.00505) (0.00590) (0.00442) (0.00659) (0.00625)
After*BNDES 0.0214* 0.00450 0.0240* 0.00328 0.0216** -0.000706
(0.0113) (0.00585) (0.0135) (0.00554) (0.0109) (0.00595)
Cashflow 0.000514*** 0.0153 0.000328 0.0186 0.000402** -0.0356





Constant 0.0566*** 0.00731** 0.0222 -0.0787** 0.0593*** 0.00608
(0.00617) (0.00943) (0.0293) (0.0318) (0.00693) (0.0121)
Observations 775 609 775 609 775 609
Number of firms 160 112 160 112 160 112
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.18: Results - Breakdown by Size of Exports
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